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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CHANGHYUN KIM: GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
(Under the direction of RICHARD A. BETTIS) 
 
Corporate governance scholars have emphasized monitoring by institutional investors as 
a primary mechanism for resolving agency problems. However, the shareholders of acquiring 
firms experienced substantial wealth destruction during the M&A wave in the late 1990s in spite 
of increasing institutional ownership. I hypothesize that this paradox is due to behavioral 
difference in two categories of institutional investors (transient vs. dedicated). Empirically, I find 
that transient institutional investors encouraged M&A activities even during the unproductive, 
value-destroying M&A wave in the late 1990s. Furthermore, the level of transient institutional 
investors‘ ownership was negatively related to M&A performance measured by cumulative 
abnormal returns. By contrast, dedicated institutional investors did not significantly impact 
M&A performance. Overall, results suggest that during merger waves the monitoring by 
transient institutional investors fails to prevent shareholder value destruction and may actually 
encourage it. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
Academics, public policy makers, and the media agree that the monitoring by 
institutional investors is an important governance solution to agency problems (Daily, Dalton, & 
Rajagopalan, 2003; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Kang & Sorensen, 1999a). Some 
characteristics which differentiate institutional investors from other types of investors have been 
suggested as the grounds for this positive impact on governance. First, the ownership stake held 
by institutional investors is usually large enough to accommodate monitoring costs that affect a 
manager‘s choice of strategy (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, 
& Grossman, 2002). However, the stake may be too small, compared to major owners, to 
privatize control rights (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Perhaps most importantly, active trading by 
institutional investors is believed to incorporate more private information into the stock price. As 
a result, the stock price more fully reflects fundamental value due to trading by institutional 
investors (Edmans & Manso, 2011; Maug, 1998).  
Collinear with the recognition of the important role played by institutional investors, 
shareholdings by institutional investors have increased, and the ownership of the U.S. 
corporations has become substantially more concentrated in the hands of institutional investors 
(Gillan & Starks, 2007a; Holderness, 2009). Indeed, institutional investors account for more than 
75 percent of the trading in equities listed on the New York Stock Exchange (Karmel, 2004). In 
addition, regulations imposed on institutional investors‘ intervention in corporate control after 
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the Great Depression that prohibited certain levels of ownership among institutional investors 
(Roe, 1991) have been weakened or eliminated to facilitate monitoring by institutional investors 
(Kaplan, 1997b). 
Given adequate concentrated ownership in the hands of institutional investors, one would 
expect shareholders‘ wealth to be well protected by the crucial roles played by institutional 
investors (Dalton et al., 2007; Kang & Sorensen, 1999a). However, the shareholders of acquiring 
firms in the U.S. experienced a huge amount of wealth destruction during the M&A wave in the 
late 1990s (Bouwman, Fuller, & Nain, 2009; Jensen, 2005). Unlike the merger wave in the 1980s, 
the average losses of acquiring shareholders cannot be explained by a wealth transfer to 
acquired-firm shareholders because the combined value of acquiring and acquired firms fell in 
the later stages of the merger wave (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005). It is also disturbing 
that even for mergers that resulted in negative acquirer returns, more than 95 percent of mutual 
funds voted for the mergers (Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008). This presents a conundrum whereby 
monitoring by institutional investors, which according to agency theory should improve 
management focus on equity returns, instead has had an insignificant or the opposite effect 
during this time period. Hence, an important question is what role, if any, did institutional 
investors play in this value-destroying wave? Did they facilitate this unprecedented wealth 
destruction or were they merely passive bystanders?  
Research into this issue contributes to the literatures of corporate governance. Prior 
literatures on corporate governance have highlighted the encouragement of M&A activities by 
risk-neutral institutional investors (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; Hoskisson et 
al., 2002) and have tested the general impact of institutional investors on M&A performance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) without considering historical context such as M&A waves. 
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Furthermore, it is rare to examine the specific behaviors or psychological processes by which 
institutional investors affect the decision making of corporate managers (Westphal & Zajac, 
2013). The behavioral approach developed in this research explains a cognitive mechanism by 
which institutional investors put pressure on firm managers. Frequent (or active) trading by 
transient institutional investors who are very sensitive to quarterly earnings release (Bushee, 
2004a; 1998) lets aspirational reference points
1
 adjust quarterly, not yearly. In the late 1990s, 
when the stock market was performing well, the reference point of firm managers for stock price 
kept adjusting in an upward direction for many consecutive quarters. As a consequence, high 
stock performance in the late 1990s may have imposed a market reference point that could not be 
justified by current operating performance and could not be sustained by internal growth in the 
short term (Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010). In response to this pressure, managers 
started searching for acquisitions that could signal continuing growth.  
This paper also contributes to explaining the phenomenon of M&A waves. Literatures on 
M&A waves have investigated the implication of the early or late position within M&A waves 
on acquisition performance (Carow, Heron, & Saxton, 2004; Mcnamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 
2008) and the firm-level determinants of M&A timing within the wave (Haleblian, McNamara, 
Kolev, & Dykes, 2012). However, the role of institutional investors on M&A timing and 
performance has not been investigated, even though Stearns and Allan (1996) argued that the 
growth and the enlarged power of financial institutions actually facilitated M&A waves.  
                                                          
1
 Research in behavioral tradition assumes that decision makers don‘t maximize profits and that decision makers 
choose the first alternative they expect to be satisfactory. It is the deviation from cognitive reference points which 
decides what is deemed satisfactory. Aspiration levels shaped by social and historical comparisons set up these 
reference points (e.g., Industry average/Prior firm performance). Through the ongoing comparisons to performance 
feedbacks, the reference points also adapt to current performance. For a comprehensive review of behavioral theory 
and reference points, refer to Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, and Ocasio (2012) and Powell, Lovallo, and Fox (2011).  
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In testing this relationship, I do not assume that all institutional investors are the same. 
Each type of institutional investors is governed by different fiduciary responsibility laws and in 
turn bring different managerial and firm behaviors (Bushee, 2004a). Therefore, to treat all 
institutional investors the same makes limits our understanding of the impact of institutional 
investors (Connelly et al., 2010; Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, & Tehranian, 2007). Modifying the 
Bushee‘s (2001a; 1998) classification on institutional ownership, I categorized institutional 
investors into dedicated and transient institutional investors. Dedicated institutional investors are 
investors who have concentrated portfolios over time with intense monitoring while transient 
institutional investors are investors who have broad portfolios and make frequent trades.  
Empirically, I find that with the strong ownership of transient institutional investors who 
are very sensitive to quarterly earnings releases and active in trading, managers pursued merger 
activities at the cost of shareholder‘s wealth apparently to avoid being caught in an earnings 
shortfall situation in the subsequent quarter. As a result, the level of transient ownership is 
positively related to M&A propensity and negatively related to M&A performance, an 
unfortunate combination. Dedicated institutional investors, by contrast, did not exert a detectable 
impact on the M&A performance during this period.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First I start with a brief historical 
review of the research context, M&A waves and corporate governance. Next, I set up two sets of 
competing hypotheses based on agency theory and behavioral theory respectively.  In setting up 
competing hypotheses, I begin with developing hypotheses on the efficacy of the capital 
structure characterized by lower cash holdings and of higher managerial ownership favored by 
institutional investors during the merger wave. Probably based on the theoretical appeal of and 
prescription by agency theory, institutional investors supported lower cash holdings and higher 
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managerial ownership. After examining the efficacy of capital structure and managerial contracts 
during the wave, I investigate the monitoring role played by institutional investors. Even though 
the capital structure or higher managerial ownership aligning managerial interests to 
shareholder‘s wealth may not work as they are designed, the monitoring of institutional investors 
by allegedly smart trading activities could make differences. First, I offer a more direct test of the 
relationship between the existence of institutional investors and firm‘s decision making on M&A. 
Then I include a methods section that includes a description of my sample, the statistical 
technique employed, variables and measures. Finally, I provided the results and implications and 
limitations of the results. 
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Chapter 2 RESEARCH CONTEXT: MERGER WAVES 
In U.S. merger activities,  the number of M&As increases rapidly and then decreases 
rapidly(Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001). The widely accepted view is that there have been 
two major merger waves since 1960 before the merger wave in the late 1990s. To understand 
how the recent merger wave may be differentiated from other prior merger waves, I briefly 
review the prior merger waves.  
2.1 Prior Merger Waves: the Merger Wave in the 1960s 
The merger wave in the late 1960s to early 1970s was characterized by conglomerate 
diversification. According to Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), 36 percent of all the acquisitions 
during 1964~1972 were of a conglomerate nature. There are two major interpretations of this 
diversification movement.  
One view is that diversification by conglomerate was executed at the cost of 
shareholder‘s wealth. The existence of diversification discount, undervaluation of diversified 
firms relative to their single-segment peers, has been suggested as compelling evidence wealth 
destruction. This value-destroying diversification strategy was understood as the outgrowth of 
managers‘ desire as agents of shareholders to lower their exposure to firm-specific risk (Amihud 
& Lev, 1981). This explanation is consistent with empirical observations on the diversification 
discount in the 1980s (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994). Using operating performance 
data, Porter (1987) also found that half of the acquisitions by major U.S. companies generated 
disappointing performance. Servaes(1996) showed that even in the 1960s when significant 
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diversification first occurred the diversification discount existed. However, he found that insider 
ownership was an effective deterrent to diversification movement in 1960s when doing so was 
costly to shareholder‘s wealth. However, insider ownership facilitated diversification in 1970s 
when the diversification discount was not significant. This suggests that risk hedging for insiders, 
an agency problem, is likely not the cause of diversification discount as agency theorists 
predicted (Servaes, 1996).  
The other view on diversification argues that diversification discount is a data artifact and 
the result of sample-selection. For example, Villalonga (2004) find that diversification discount 
disappears or turns into a premium after correcting selection bias. In addition to the statistically 
vulnerable foundation of the diversification discount, the higher GDP and productivity growth 
observed in the 1960s also casts suspicion on the view that diversification was value-destroying 
(Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2001). 
The significance and existence of the diversification discount is still under debate 
although most scholars accept the existence of this discount
1
. Accordingly, main focus of the 
debate is evolving toward under what circumstances and what degree of diversification is value 
created or destroyed. The view on diversification is expanding to take into account diverse 
contingencies that firms are facing rather than focus only on contingencies stemming from the 
principal agent relationship (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 
1998; Rumelt, 1974; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987).  
2.2 Prior Merger Waves: the Merger Wave in the 1980s 
The value of takeovers increased abruptly in the late 1980s with the increase of number 
of announced mergers. The amount of merger activity was historically high and represented 
                                                          
1
For the review of corporate diversification, refer to the Montgomery(1994) 
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roughly 5~6% of GDP. Before 1980s, merger activity over 2~3% of GDP was unusual. Jensen 
interpreted the merger wave as the process of eliminating the excess capacity that the U.S. 
corporations had in the 1980s. From the perspective of Jensen‘s free cash flow hypothesis 
(Jensen, 1986, 1989), given the relaxed anti-trust regulations and increased foreign competition 
since the 1970, U.S. corporations should have distributed all their free cash flow to the 
shareholders in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Instead, he asserted that they had invested 
substantial amount of the free cash flow in negative NPV projects, such as capacity expansion 
for corporate growth. Hence, many corporations had excess capacity which incurred substantial 
opportunity costs due to the underutilized resources. This inefficient use of assets resulted in an 
increase in the market for corporate control whereby inefficient managers were replaced through 
takeovers.  
Another group of scholars viewed the merger wave largely as a process of unbundling 
conglomerates (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994; Shleifer & Vishny, 1990). They argued that 
the trigger was largely the disappointment with the diversification strategy undertaken by 
conglomerates since 1960s. Furthermore, the increased availability of mutual funds made it 
easier for individual shareholders to diversify their own portfolios directly. From the perspective 
of shareholder value creation, corporation could return to a less diversified posture, since 
shareholders could now easily diversify their own portfolio more effectively to reflect their risk 
preferences without being subject to a conglomerate diversification discount. Hence the agents of 
diversification should be the shareholders, not the corporation itself (Stearns & Allan, 1996). 
However, the empirical evidence for these two explanations implies that excess capacity 
and de-conglomeration arguments only partially explain the 1980s (Kaplan, 1997a). First, if 
overcapacity was the trigger of the merger wave, targets should under-perform due to over-
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capacity before the takeovers, and these companies should cut their investments after the 
takeovers. Indeed, Kaplan (1989a) and Kaplan and Stein (1993) find supporting evidence that the 
firms purchased by management buyout firms reduced capital expenditures. Agrawal and Jaffe 
(2003), however, failed to find that targets perform poorly before acquisitions in terms of 
operating performance and stock return. Furthermore, Servaes (1994) finds no evidence that 
targets of hostile takeovers and of going private transactions overinvest in capital expenditures 
before the takeover. 
For the deinstitutionalization of conglomerate, again evidence is mixed. Davis and Greve 
(1994) finds that 52 percent of larger firms operated in three or more 2-digit industries in 1980 
while only 30 percent did so in 1990. Montgomery (1994) finds, however, that the typical S&P 
500 firm in 1991 had the same number of industry segments as the typical S&P 500 firm in 1981. 
Similarly, Comment and Jarrell (1995)  find only modest declines in diversification over the 
1980s. 
Mixed evidences on the causes of the merger wave should call for a more comprehensive 
approach to this phenomenon. Donaldson (1994) suggests that the merger wave was a response 
to the market-wide undervaluation of the firms mainly driven by excess capacity, managerial 
diversification, and outdated governance structure for dealing with the discontented investors. 
According to Donaldson, the average market to book ratio of S&P 500 was less than 1.2 in 1982 
while it had been more than 1.6 in the early 1970s. However, legal constraints introduced after 
the Great Depression, such as the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, and the Securities Act of 
1933, raised the cost of active involvement of investors. Those regulations imposed restrictions 
on the communications among institutional investors and between investors and managers and 
on directly owning stakes of a firm. One way to get around these legal constraints was to 
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purchase entire companies by taking higher debt (Jensen, 1989). Raiders who sensed the 
discontent of shareholder around financial returns, could secure financing (usually junk bonds) 
by using the assets of the target firm. This made it possible for corporate raiders to buy large 
firms with very little cash. As a consequence, LBOs (Leveraged Buyouts) became central to the 
merger wave in the late 1980s. A buyout is a transaction where shareholders of a listed firm are 
bought out by a new group of investors – usually including incumbent management, a 
specialized buyout firm, commercial banks and public debt holders. LBOs are usually 
differentiated from other type of buyouts by the use of high leverage (Chaddad, 2009). Typical 
debt-to-capital ratios of LBOs were 85% in the 1980s (Kaplan, 1991). Actually, between 1981 
and 1989, more than 2400 listed corporations underwent an LBO and in 1988 (Wiersema & 
Liebeskind, 1995) the total value of the buyouts exceeded $77 billion, nearly one-third of the 
value of all M&As. Subsequently, the combined borrowings of all nonfinancial corporations in 
the United States were around $2 trillion in 1988, up from $835 billion in 1979 (Jensen, 1989).  
In response to the rebirth of active investors in the form of takeover financing, managers 
tried to introduce anti-takeover devices, such as the poison pill and golden parachute defenses 
(Davis & Greve, 1997). Many states passed business combination (BC) laws imposing 
restrictions to hinder corporate raiders from gaining access to the target firm‘s assets for the 
purpose of paying down acquisition debt (Giroud & Mueller, 2010). Hence, we observe 
historically high levels of tender offers (the indicator of hostile takeovers), more than 20 percent 
of total takeovers in this period. Indeed, about half of all major U.S. corporations received hostile 
takeover bids in the 1980s (Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). In a nutshell, Donaldson (1994) calls 
the 1980s the decade of confrontation between the capital markets and corporate managers. To 
Donaldson, the excess capacity problem and the investor‘s disappointment with the 
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conglomerates were among the factors driving market-wide undervaluation. Kaplan (1997a) 
argues that the undervaluation argument articulated by Donaldson (1994) is the most convincing 
explanation of the merger wave in the 1980s. 
In conclusion, the merger wave in the late 1980s is distinguished by market-wide 
undervaluation, frequent usage of high leverage and hostile takeovers due to the confrontation 
between the institutional investors and corporate managers (Donaldson, 1994; Holmstrom & 
Kaplan, 2001; Jensen, 1989).  
2.3 Changes in Corporate Governance 
Execution of hostile takeovers is usually the last resort in resolving the confrontation 
between the discontented institutional investors and corporate managers. Instead, diverse ways of 
exerting shareholder pressure are employed to mitigate the tensions. Typically institutional 
investors submit proposals to improve governance structures for shareholder wealth creation 
with the implicit or explicit threat of selling a large block of shares or a hostile takeover. 
Indeed, the locus of shareholder activism shifted from individuals to institutions in this 
period. Until the mid-1980s, the major proponents of shareholder proposals were individuals. 
Since the formation of The Council of Institutional Investors in 1985, institutional investors have 
become the main focus of shareholder activism. According to the record on shareholder 
proposals submitted from 1987 to 1994, the main issues of interests were repeal of classified 
board members (15%), elimination of poison pills (12%), board independence (13.7%), and 
executive pay (11.4%). The distribution of shareholder proposals submitted imply that the board 
of directors became more independent from managers as the board of directors got more outside 
members and that the impediments to hostile takeover were weakened (Gillan & Starks, 2007b).      
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In addition to eliminating restrictions on shareholder‘s involvement, institutional 
investors also backed the introduction of stock-based incentives, thereby helping align the 
interest of managers to those of shareholders. For example, from 1980 and 1994, the mean value 
of stock option grants to CEOs of publically traded firms increased by 683 percent from 
$155,000 to $1.2 million. The median value of stock option grants rose from $0 to $325,000. As 
a consequence, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performances rose substantially 
since 1980 (Hall & Liebman, 1998).    
Furthermore, institutional owners became the major investor group for, more than 50%, 
the U.S. public firms as household stock ownership intermediated by institutions had increased 
continuously. Indeed, the level of household participation in the stock market primarily through 
institutions, such as the purchase of shares in mutual funds, increased from roughly 20 % in 
around 1980 to over 50 % in 2001 (Davis, 2008). Accordingly, from 1980 to 1996 the ownership 
stake held by institutional investors on the U.S. public firms nearly doubled from under 30 
percent to over 50 percent (Gompers & Metrick, 2001). Furthermore, institutional investors 
account for more than 75percent of the trading in equities listed on the NYSE (Karmel, 2004). 
Given the conception of firms as the vehicles for shareholder value maximization and several 
coordinating mechanism (e.g., Institutional Shareholder Services, Investor Responsibility 
Research Center), it is reasonable to argue that institutional investors substantially increased the 
emphasis of increasing shareholder wealth on senior level managers. 
The merger wave in the 1980s characterized by hostile takeovers and the epochal 
transition in corporate governance systems accompanied by the continuous expansion of 
institutional ownership caused institutional investors to exercise more power over corporate 
managers (Kang & Sorensen, 1999b; Kaplan, 1997a).  
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2.4 The Merger Wave in the Late 1990s 
The fear of hostile takeover in the 1980s and the spread of incentive-based compensation 
including stock options and grant plans for managers (Kaplan, 1989b) in association with the 
enhanced governance structure motivated U.S. corporations to more fully pursue shareholder 
value maximization as the ultimate goal of corporations (Davis, 2009). Therefore, hostile 
takeovers and higher leverage were no longer essential to fix managerial misbehaviors in the 
1990s like in the 1980s. Indeed, while the portion of hostile takeovers out of total takeovers in 
the 1980s ranges from 11percent to 18percent, the portion in the late 1990s (1996~2000) ranges 
from 2.3 percent to 7.2 percent (Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006). The issuance of 
junk bonds, the main financial mechanism of hostile takeovers in the 1980s, also declined in the 
1990s. Specifically, while more than 50% of junk bond issued were related with takeovers in the 
1980s, the fraction used for takeovers decreased to 30% in the 1990s (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 
2001).   
Despite the reduced tension between institutional investors and corporate managers, 
however, the merger wave in the late 1990s was huge compared to all other merger waves. M&A 
activity as the percent of GDP during the merger wave in the late 1980s, historically high at that 
time, was around 5%. Surprisingly, the activity in the late 1990s was more than 15% of GDP 
(Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2001). According to Dong et. al(2006), the total value of transactions 
(2001 dollars) from 1993 to 2000 was $4.35 trillion. This is much greater than the total value of 
transactions in the preceding 15 years of their dataset. 
More importantly, acquiring-firm shareholders lost 12 cents at acquisition announcement 
per dollar spent on acquisition for a total loss of $240 billion from 1998 through 2001(Moeller et 
14 
 
al., 2005)
2
. Moreover, Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) find that on average, the long-run 
performance of acquisitions undertaken in this period is significantly negative. They also report 
that even cash mergers undertaken during the period produced negative long-run return. This is a 
very surprising finding because usually cash mergers are believed to deliver positive short and 
long-term return to the shareholders of acquiring firms (Chang, 1998; Fuller, Netter, & 
Stegemoller, 2002). Indeed, in their study, the cash mergers undertaken in the merger wave in 
the 1980s generated positive long-term return to the acquiring shareholders.  
2.5 Explanations on the Merger Wave in the Late 1990s 
As noted earlier, it has been widely accepted that the discontent of institutional investors 
and the contests between institutional investors and managers led to a massive merger wave in 
the 1980s. This raises how to explain the even larger merger wave in the late 1990s when there 
were higher firm valuations and more aligned interests between institutional investors and 
managers? Especially the extraordinary higher value, volume, and disappointing returns to 
acquiring firm shareholders during the merger wave in the late 1990s present a conundrum. 
Three primary explanations are possible. 
First, market-timing approaches to merger waves suggest that the cause of the merger 
wave in the late 1990s was in the overvaluation of stock markets during the period. The 
migration of U.S. household investments from bank savings to stock market since the early 
                                                          
2
 Moeller et.al (2005) showed that a small number of mega acquisitions (87 mega deals) account for the huge wealth 
destruction by the merger wave and that without the acquisitions the wealth of acquiring-firm shareholders would 
not be destructed so much. Then is it not appropriate to call the whole merger wave as a value destroying one? 
Notice the fact that most bidders of the small number of mega takeovers in Moeller et. al(2005)‘s sample are serial 
acquirers. After they made small consecutive successes in acquiring firms, they lost far more than all the gains 
acquired by prior takeovers on the mega deals. It is a typical story often found in the boom and bust period. 
Moreover, the bigger size of the deal attracts more attention from shareholders including institutional investors than 
small deals. If higher attention of institutional investors leads to more wealth destruction, it is a more perplexing 
conundrum to be addressed. 
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1980s provided raw material for the stock markets boom in the 1990s. And overvalued bidders 
leveraged their over-estimated market value by purchasing undervalued real assets through stock 
swap mergers. That‘s why we observed a huge clustering of merger activities in the late 1990s. A 
missing link in this approach to the merger wave, based on behavioral finance, is how the 
managers or shareholders of target firms came to accept the overvalued bidder firm‘s stock as the 
appropriate currency of the mergers. Rhodes-Kropf et.al (Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; 
Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, & Viswanathan, 2005) theorize and show that when there is market 
and firm specific overvaluations in the market, targets tend to underestimate the overvaluation of 
bidders due to information asymmetry between bidders and targets. However, targets often 
overestimate synergies due to market-wide optimism. Furthermore, target managers with short 
time horizons have an incentive to accept the bidder‘s temporarily overvalued equity, because 
they can liquidate the overvalued bidder stock by selling the equity to the bull market before the 
busts. Therefore, targets are more prone to accept bad-quality mergers during the bull market. 
Hence, the market timing approach suggests that the performance of mergers undertaken during 
the bull market would be poorer than the performance of mergers undertaken during the bear 
market.  
A second set of explanations argues that market wide overvaluation of stock alone can‘t 
be a necessary and sufficient condition for the merger wave. Harford (2005) showed that the 
number of cash based takeovers which do not involve any overvalued bidder‘s stock for the 
transactions also increased substantially during the period. There was no significant temporal 
differences between cash based mergers and stock swap mergers in terms of clustering during the 
merger waves. Based on those findings, he suggests that the economic motivation to reallocate 
industry-wide assets to cope with technological, regulatory, and economic shocks needs to be 
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addressed to get more comprehensive explanatory power regarding merger waves. In this 
approach, market-wide overvaluation is only a necessary condition under which the merger 
activities are easily executed by relaxed financial constraints. By combining economically 
rational motives with market timing motives, this approach to the merger wave implies positive 
performance of takeovers undertaken in the bull market.  
However, the high incidence of cash based mergers at the same time when stock swap 
mergers were clustered does not necessarily supports the existence of economically rational 
motives for merger waves (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). From the perspective of vicarious 
organizational learning (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Levinthal & March, 1993) or institutional 
theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), firms can mimic other firm‘s behavior even though their 
economic conditions differ from the firms that they imitate. From the perspective of this stream 
of research, the choice on the medium of exchange, cash or stock swap, is not the primary 
concern. In the middle of a merger wave, firms copy takeover practices of others in an effort to 
acquire legitimacy. Indeed, Haunschild (1993) finds that director-ties are a linking mechanism 
for inter-organizational imitation. Since directors have many things in common and trust each 
other, they provide a ready path for imitation. Thus, she found that firms are more likely to 
participate in acquisitions if one of their top managers sat on the board of another firm that had 
engaged in an acquisition during the prior three years. At their recent study on merger waves, 
Goel and Thakor (2010) also identify CEO‘s compensation envy as the driver of the merger 
wave and find empirical support for their predictions. According to them, CEOs envy other 
CEOs who get paid more due to enlarged size by takeovers. However, organic growth through 
internal capital expenditures rarely provides a window for compensation change naturally while 
acquisition opens the window (Harford & Li, 2007). Hence, envious CEOs are motivated to 
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conduct value-destroying but size-enhancing acquisitions. Goel and Thakor (2010) argue that the 
merger waves driven by CEO‘s envy are different from other merger waves driven by economic 
shock (Harford, 2005) or market timing (Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004) in terms of the 
distribution of target size and bidder returns. With CEOs envy, the earlier targets are smaller than 
the later targets and bidder returns are lower for later bidders than for earlier bidders, while target 
size and bidder returns are randomly distributed in the merger waves driven only by shocks or 
only by overvaluation. Given the fact that a small number of mega-mergers undertaken between 
1998 and 2001 mainly account for the biggest losses of the merger wave (Moeller et al., 2005), 
the explanation based on CEOs envy seems to be quite plausible in explaining the merger wave 
in the late 1990s. 
Hence, a legitimate question is why the enhancement of governance mechanisms in the 
1980s and the early 1990s did not work as expected? Furthermore, what role did institutional 
investors play in this value-destroying wave? As a major investor group, did they play any role 
as a protector of shareholder‘s wealth? Or did they facilitate this unprecedented wealth 
destruction? These are important questions that need addressing.
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Chapter 3: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, I review various theories and studies on corporate governance and develop 
two sets of competing hypotheses based on agency theory and behavioral theory respectively. 
First, I develop theory and hypotheses on the role played by the governance mechanisms for 
shareholder wealth from the perspective of agency theory. Then I develop contrasting hypotheses 
based on the behavioral theory of the firm. However, I first review the separation of ownership 
and control as the contextual setting for diverse governance mechanisms. 
3.1 Separation of Ownership and Control 
The separation of ownership and control makes it easier to raise capital while control is 
legally delegated to professional management. Especially in the industries with capital intensity 
and economies of scale and network, the idea of the separation of ownership and control has 
large advantages (Chandler, 1977). Founders and their family members who found that they did 
not have enough wealth to finance large-scale industrial operations accepted this form of 
organization for growth and geographical expansion. Subsequently, this form of organization 
became the major forms of the modern public corporations in the United States. 
Berle and Means (1932) were the first to elaborate the problems with separation of 
ownership and control. They argued that separation of ownership and control provided a 
platform for managers to pursue their own interests instead of maximizing returns to the 
shareholders. If the costs associated with a manager‘s deviation from the shareholder‘s interest 
19 
 
 offset all the expected merits of the separation of ownership and control, separation of 
ownership and control failed. Jensen argued that these return reducing costs result directly or 
indirectly from the conflict of interests between shareholders (Principals) and managers (Agents). 
Furthermore, these agency costs are as real as other production costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Shirking (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) which is empire building at the cost of shareholders‘ profit 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981), exploiting managerial perks such as the selection of luxurious modes of 
transportation for managers (Rajan & Wulf, 2006) and pursuing the quiet life without improving 
productivity (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003) are examples of  shareholder value-destroying 
actions. 
Therefore, given the presence of agency problems resulting from opportunistic behaviors 
by managers (agents), investors (principals) need governance mechanisms
1
 to safeguard the 
capital invested in the firms. With the presence of strong shareholder governance, the possibility 
of managerial opportunism is curbed while shareholder value is maximized. In the absence of 
strong governance mechanisms, the separation of ownership and control may create agency costs, 
which can overwhelm the capital raising benefits of the separation of ownership and control. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), a strong governance system should meet two 
conditions. First, it should minimize managerial discretion to pursue strategies and practices that 
benefit managers at the cost of shareholders. Second, it should align the incentives of managers 
to the incentives of shareholders. 
                                                          
1
Williamson (2005) defines governance as the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and 
realize mutual gains. New York Stock Exchanges (2010) defines corporate governance as ―structures and policies of 
control such as transparency for corporations and investors, disclosure policies and communications.‖ Refer to the 
extensive review of diverse definitions on the corporate governance at the Donaldson (2012).  
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3.2 Governance by Capital Structure 
3.2.1 Agency Perspective 
From Jensen‘s perspective, increasing debt substantially is one of the most effective ways 
for minimizing managerial discretion to pursue actions inconsistent with creation of shareholder 
value. Hence, this debt acts as an effective governance mechanism. The underlying logic is that 
without the discretionary cash flow, even a self-interested manager can‘t pursue his own interest 
at the cost of shareholders‘ wealth. The obligation to make fixed interest payments in the 
presence of minimal financial slack will prevent managers from investing in managerial projects 
inconsistent with the shareholder‘s interest. In addition to preventing managers from squandering 
discretionary resources, higher leverage makes firms rely on external financing whenever 
managers try to expand current running businesses or launch a new business. The external 
financing processes let independent market participants, such as analysts and bankers, screen 
whether or not each new project is beneficial to shareholders. Furthermore, the information 
released during the screening processes makes the firm more transparent to outside shareholders. 
Notice also the fact that interest payments are tax deductible. This is a public policy incentive to 
use higher leverage. Considering the discipline effects with tax benefits, debt restructuring can 
be seen as a powerful change agent for aligning ownership and managerial interests in 
concordance with value enhancement. Based on these insights on debt, Jensen went so far at one 
point as to suggest that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) maximizing disciplining and tax effects of 
debt would replace the modern public corporation (Jensen, 1989). 
This prescription becomes more powerful if one assumes efficient capital markets. 
Capital market efficiency makes investment decisions independent of internal versus external 
financing. If value enhancing investments do become available, capital market efficiency ensures 
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that financing can be obtained externally. Pressure resulting from obligations to pay interest 
negatively impact only negative NPV projects usually associated with managerial ego. Hence, 
firms don‘t need to reserve cash inside firms for value-enhancing projects. Any cash beyond the 
transaction needs should be distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends or share 
repurchase. The formalization of this is called the Free Cash Flow (FCF) hypothesis (Jensen, 
1986). According to FCF hypothesis, firms with FCF tend to invest in low-return or even 
negative-return projects. Additions to cash reserves also occur when managers accumulate free 
cash flow rather than spending it or returning it to shareholders immediately. Therefore, excess 
cash holdings mean more than a proxy for performance. Excess cash reserves are stockpiled free 
cash flow. Concordantly, the predicted relationship between cash holdings and takeover 
decisions based on the FCF hypothesis is positive (Harford, 1999). Indeed, Jensen (1986, 1989) 
focused on the cumulative cash balance rather than the yearly cash flow when he criticized the 
managerial misbehavior. Jensen (1986) also asserted that mergers and acquisitions were a 
primary method by which managers spent accumulated free cash flow instead of paying it out to 
shareholders. By doing so, managers are able to reduce their personal undiversified risk or 
expand their authority even though the takeovers were not value increasing for shareholders. 
Opler et.al (1999) and Harford (1999) find that the likelihood of  being a bidder is positively 
correlated with cash holdings. 
 
H1a. The higher the levels of cash holdings in a particular firm, the higher the 
likelihood of the firm being an acquisition bidder in the merger wave in the late 1990s .  
The investigation only on the relationship between the likelihood of being a bidder and 
the cash richness is not enough to determine whether or not these takeovers are value increasing 
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or decreasing. For this purpose, we should measure the valuation consequence of the bidding 
decisions. 
H2a. The higher the levels of cash holdings in a particular firm, the lower the M&A 
performance in the merger wave in the late 1990s. 
3.2.2 Behavioral Perspective 
In the late 1990s when the stock market was over-performing(Shleifer & Vishny, 2003), 
however, cash holdings came to have a different meaning to managers. As the stock market 
quickly incorporated a current positive trend in a linear way into the price of the stock, the 
aspiration level imposed to the firm by external investors was also adjusted quickly in upward 
direction in a recursive fashion (Mishina et al., 2010). Managers needed to justify this upward 
adjustment of aspirations by delivering sound growth signs at their every quarterly earnings 
releases (Bushee, 2004). If the firms succeeded in showing sound performance above the 
adjusted aspirations, then the aspirations readjusted again in an upward direction after the 
earnings releases (Lant, 1992). The quarterly consecutive interactions between the shift in 
aspiration level and positive performance feedback let the firms face a situation where the firms 
find it difficult or impossible meet the revised demands of external investors with an organic 
growth strategy. Given the mean-reverting property of firm performance (Brooks & Buckmaster, 
1976), the managers of firms with high stock performance in the late 1990s would increasingly 
be less likely to meet the expectation as aspirations continued to escalate. As a result, the 
managers would frame the situation as a choice between an almost certain loss due to high 
probability of an earnings shortfall or a possibility to escape the loss if they engage in taking 
high risk actions outside of usual local search boundary, such as acquisitions (Mishina et al., 
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2010). In other words, the almost certain negative gap between recursively adjusted aspirations  
and expected performance made managers engage in problematic search beyond organic profit 
increasing options within the local search boundary (internal to firm) to avoid a declining profit 
situation (Cyert & March, 1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). M&A caught the attention of 
managers as a visible and plausible option to address to the unrealistic growth expectation of 
external investors. That‘s why we observe an unprecedented size merger wave in the late 1990s 
even though it ended with a value destruction of acquiring shareholders.  
In this stressful situation, cash holdings as slack contribute to the organizational 
stabilization in two ways. First, sufficient cash holdings made it possible for managers to 
consider the option of share repurchases to mollify the revised aspiration of external investors. 
As an alternative to pursuing stock-for-stock type M&As to meet the heightened market 
expectations, stock repurchase announcements are a proven means to improve or keep the stock 
price despite of earnings shortfall (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003). A 
dominant reason for the positive response of market to share repurchase is that returning cash to 
shareholders is interpreted as a strong sign of commitment to shareholders (Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, & Michaely, 2005; D'Mello & Shroff, 2000). Stock repurchase often leads to positive 
stock performance even without following actions of buying shares (Zajac & Westphal, 1994).  
Actually, Benner and Ranganathan (2012) found that firms undertaking strategic actions causing 
analysts‘ negative recommendations are more likely to announce a higher value of share 
repurchase, offsetting the growing illegitimacy. By leveraging sufficient cash holdings as an 
indicator of share repurchase, managers were able to sugarcoat and retard upward adjustment of 
aspirations of external investors. Contrastingly, managers with high current firm performance 
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without sufficient cash holdings don‘t have such buffers which can absorb external pressure and 
protect the organizational core. Cyert and March (1963) argue that  
―When the environment outruns aspiration-level adjustment… others (slacks) are used to 
meet the revised demands of those members of the coalition whose demands adjust most 
rapidly-usually those most deeply involved in the organization.‖  
Second, cash partially isolates managers from the potentially severe consequences of the 
winner‘s curse in corporate takeover battles (Kagel & Levin, 1986) . The market for corporate 
control is similar to auctions in many aspects. Winners are determined by the system of bidding. 
And the high bidder (acquiring firm) earned profits only when the value of the item (target firm 
in the corporate takeovers) is higher than the amount bid; others bidders earned zero profits (or 
negative profits due to search costs) for that auction period. The high bidder then tends to be the 
one with the most optimistic estimate of the item‘s value. This adverse-selection problem often 
results in winning bids that produce below normal or even negative profits. The systematic 
failure to take into account adverse selection problem is referred to as the ―winner‘s curse‖ (Roll, 
1986; Wilson, 1977). The presence of adverse-selection problem is often attributed to the 
negative (non-significant) profits of acquirers in the market for corporate control. For the firm 
with insufficient cash holdings, the window for stock-for-stock M&As in the late 1990s was an 
opportunity to join auctions with bounded intelligence on the terms and conditions of the auction, 
such as the number of auction periods and the biased information on the value of the target. 
When the bubble collapsed, the stock of acquirers lost much of its value and the shareholder of 
target firm would not accept the stock of acquiring firm as an appropriate medium of exchange. 
Therefore, no additional auction period is given to the firms which should rely only on equity for 
the M&As when the bubble bursts. The sense of emergency and uncertainty on the ending period 
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made the managers watch that their equity value is overvalued and disregard the rest such as the 
equity value of target firm was also overvalued in the late 1990s. The combination of uncertainty 
inherent to auction periods and less through investigation on the value of target firms produces 
aggressive bidding that often results in negative profits- the ―winner‘s curse.‖  
While overvalued stock is a resource tied to a specific time range, cash holdings is not 
tied to a specific use or time range. Firms with sufficient cash holdings have more auction 
periods even when the equity market collapses because they have cash as the alternative to 
overvalued stock for M&As. Another advantage is that when the equity market collapsed, the 
firm with cash could buy the same target at a discounted price with their cash. Hence, the 
managers of the firms with sufficient cash are motivated to wait and see during the period. The 
fungibility and reversibility of cash permits managers to wait until the price of targets back to 
normal range (Kim & Bettis, 2013). Therefore, 
H1b.  The higher the levels of cash holdings in a particular firm, the lower the 
likelihood of the firm being an acquisition bidder in the merger wave in the late 1990s .  
H2b. The higher the levels of cash holdings in a particular firm, the higher the M&A 
performance in the merger wave in the late 1990s . 
3.3 Governance by Contracts 
The second component of strong governance is to align the incentives of managers with 
the incentives of shareholders. Managerial contracting is a primary mechanism to obtain this 
component of strong governance. While governance by capital structure focuses on minimizing 
agency costs by eliminating resource under the discretion of managers, governance by contracts 
focuses on maximizing the benefit of shareholders by providing managers strong incentives 
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aligned with increasing shareholders‘ wealth. As such, the primary focus of managerial 
contracting is on ex ante incentive alignment (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In designing ex-ante contracts, a key issue is how to cover effectively future 
contingencies critical to shareholder‘s wealth. It is a practical impossibility to address all the 
potential contingencies explicitly in the ex-ante contracts. The most fundamental solution is to 
make managers buy 100% ownership of the firm, thereby extinguishing the separation of 
ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since such fundamental reorganization of 
ownership is usually not feasible, giving some portion of ownership to managers is believed to 
bring similar effects into the relationship between shareholders and managers. Indeed, among the 
100 largest U.S. companies, 52% of the firms require executives to own shares and another 15% 
encourage such ownership, a major governance form in managerial contracting (Sundaramurthy, 
Rhoades, & Rechner, 2005).  In this paper, I checked the efficacy of equity based incentive 
system as a major governance form aligning managers‘ incentive in the context of merger and 
acquisition wave in the late 1990s.  
3.3.1 Agency Perspective   
In examining how managerial ownership affects the proclivity of firms to engage in 
takeovers and the resultant deal performance, agency scholars have highlighted the difference in 
risk profiles between managers and shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Beatty & Zajac, 1994; 
Lambert, Larcker, & Verrecchia, 1991; Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996). From the 
perspective of agency theory, managers have an undiversified portfolio including their human 
capital and expected future (non)-pecuniary benefits stemming from their invested human capital. 
Such managers would be less likely to engage in risky projects than risk-neutral shareholders 
who have widely diversified portfolio. As a result, managers will tend to excessively discount 
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future earnings and subsequently under invest if there is no further contractual arrangement 
narrowing the discrepancy between shareholders and managers in risk preference function.  The 
formalization of this argument is the risk aversion theory (Donaldson, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
Agency theory suggests granting equity ownership and stock options as a prescription for 
the manager‘s risk aversion problem. Based on the expectation that risk taking positively affects 
the value of firm equity reflecting more fundamental value of the firm than short-term 
accounting metrics,  stock-based incentive system are supposed to induce managers to take more 
risk than other performance based pay systems using only an accounting performance measure 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Souder & Bromiley, 2012).  
Both the risk-averse tendency of managers and the incentive alignment effects of stock 
ownership relate higher managerial ownership to higher probability of being a bidder in M&A 
settings. Higher managerial ownership makes manager‘s portfolio even more concentrated 
around the focal firm. Hence, risk-averse managers (agents) would have a stronger incentive to 
diversify their portfolio concentrated around the focal firm than before. Usually the observed risk 
of conglomerates is lower than that of firm with single business or more-focused business 
structure. Concordantly, there is an incentive for risk-averse managers to pursue diversifying 
acquisitions to reduce the risk of their portfolio invested in their focal firms even though it does 
not contribute to the risk reduction for external shareholders. By combining the risk-reduction 
property of diversifying acquisitions with the risk spread incentive of managers, agency theorists 
have positively related higher managerial ownership with the probability of engaging in 
diversifying acquisitions (Amihud, Dodd, & Weinstein, 1986a; Amihud & Lev, 1981). However, 
the empirical results on managerial ownership and propensity to engage in diversifying mergers 
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are not consistent (Bodolica & Spraggon, 2009). While some found a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and diversifying mergers (Amihud & Lev, 1981; May, 1995), 
others postulate that ownership structure and the proclivity of diversifying mergers are not 
related (Lane et al., 1998; Lewellen, Loderer, & Ahron, 1989) or negatively related (Denis, 
Denis, & Sarin, 1997). One of the fundamental reasons of diverging results is the subjectivity of 
the definition of diversifying mergers. Actually, while a variety of measures has been used to 
measure the extent of relatedness in an acquisition, results are very sensitive to the selection of 
measures (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999).  It seems to be practically impossible to discern 
diversifying mergers from non-diversifying mergers even in an ex-post manner.  
Notice the fact that incentive alignment effects expected by providing stock ownership 
predict a positive relationship between higher managerial ownership and non-diversifying 
mergers. Increased managerial ownership will align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders more than before and the more closely tied alignment creates a stronger incentive 
for managers to look after variance-increasing investments such as non-diversifying mergers.  
Unless managers perfectly discern non-diversifying mergers from diversifying mergers in an ex-
ante manner or vice-versa, the pursuit of mergers is seemingly an ideal option to meet both the 
preference of risk neutral shareholders and the risk diversification needs of risk-averse managers 
at the same time. Moreover, one of key characteristics which distinguish the merger wave in the 
1990s from the merger wave in the 1980s is an ever-increasing percentage of mergers in which 
target and acquirer are in the same industry, more related and non-diversifying (Andrade et al., 
2001). Given the distinction of the merger wave in the late 1990s, agency perspective predicts 
following hypothesis regarding managerial ownership. 
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H3a. The higher the ownership levels of managerial ownership in a particular firm, the 
higher the likelihood of the firm being an acquisition bidder in the merger wave in the 
late 1990s. 
It is interesting that following a merger, top managers of acquiring firms, on average, 
experienced significant increases in compensation even though the acquired firm performed 
poorly  (Schmidt & Fowler, 1990). Moreover, for positive stock performance of acquired firms, 
the manager‘s compensation improves substantially. For large capital expenditures, 
compensation changes are much smaller and more sensitive to the performance than for 
takeovers (Harford & Li, 2007). Bliss and Rosen (2001) also found that CEO compensation and 
wealth typically increase after takeovers in bank sector even if the bidder‘s stock price declines. 
Favorable treatment of takeovers compared to capital expenditure in terms of compensation 
provides downside protection for managers. In the presence of downside protection managers 
pay less attention to downside risk and more to upside potential (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). 
Furthermore, some degree of wealth loss due to a takeover is acceptable to managers because the 
compensation renegotiation processes following the merger would compensate for the negative 
wealth effects due to the stock value loss (Harford & Li, 2007).  
Therefore,  
 
H4a. The higher the ownership levels of managerial ownership in a particular firm, the 
lower the M&A performance in the merger wave in the late 1990s. 
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3.3.2 Behavioral Perspective 
While agency theory focuses on the risk avoiding tendency of agents and incentive 
alignment effects driven by stock ownership based on the expectation of positive gains through  
risk taking consistent with shareholder value, behavioral theorists have put emphasis on 
unintended risk-bearing consequences of managerial stock ownership which leads to loss-
avoiding behaviors of managers (Martin, Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 2013; Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998).  Behavioral scholars argue that for a better understanding of the governance effects 
driven by managerial ownership, one should take into account that managers also consider the 
downside risk to their wealth by pursuing high-variance strategy for the purpose of increasing 
prospective wealth. This managerial downside risk bearing includes vulnerable managerial 
income, heightened employment risk, reputational damage in labor market as well as negative 
wealth effects on managerial stock ownership previously awarded to executives when things go 
wrong (Alessandri & Seth, 2014). Due to this risk-bearing property of stock-ownership, 
managers tend to pursue lower risk strategy for the protection of their undiversified wealth 
including their human capital even when they are forced to bear additional risk through 
additional stock ownership (Sanders, 2001b; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Wright, Kroll, Krug, & 
Pettus, 2007).  
In addition to risk bearing consequence of stock ownership, behavioral theorists 
highlighted that, it is managerial assessment of risk in an ex ante fashion which affects 
managerial decision making, not ex post risk reduction that is assumed to be caused by the 
mergers (Bettis & Hall, 1982). In particular, the high uncertainty associated with acquisition 
outcomes (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987), non-routineness, restricted 
use of information, and speed of decision making due to acquisition processes involving the 
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inter-organizational level (Jemison, Pablo, & Sitkin, 1996) make it more difficult for managers to 
be confident of that a particular acquisition would contribute to lowering their personal risk in an 
ex-ante manner. For behavioral theorists, agency theorists underestimate the downside risk 
involved to takeover decision making, while they overestimate the intellectual capability of 
managers in predicting the expected outcome of a particular M&A. Given the risky nature of 
acquisitions (Jemison et al., 1996; Jensen & Ruback, 1983), managers perceive takeovers as 
risky projects compared to internal capital expenditure when they compare the two. Hence, in 
general, managers with higher stock ownership would be more conservative in pursuing 
expansionary growth opportunities through acquiring other firms than shareholders. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that higher managerial ownership lead to more cautious behavior of managers in the 
takeover decision-making processes (Lambert et al., 1991; Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993; 
Sanders, 2001a).  
 
H3b. The higher the ownership levels of managerial ownership in a particular firm, the 
lower the likelihood of the firm being an acquisition bidder in the merger wave in the late 
1990s. 
 
While agency scholars build their theory based on risk-averse property of managers, 
behavioral theorists build on loss-avoidance property of managers. The term of loss aversion 
traces back to Kahneman and Tversky‘s (1979) prospect theory. As an alternative to expected 
utility theory in traditional economics, they proposed prospect theory. A key idea of prospect 
theory is that when individuals (including managers) face a situation where they should select an 
alternative, they tend to follow a discrete function where alternatives are framed as either gains 
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or losses in comparison to a single reference point rather than a continuous indifference curve 
based on the trade-off relationship between risk and return calculated by perfect rationality 
(Shimizu, 2007). This idea of a single reference point is central to modern theories of individual 
and organizational choice (Cyert & March, 1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). And the discrete 
function follows a concave curve for gains and a convex curve for losses, meaning losses loom 
larger than corresponding gains. In other words, managers would pay asymmetric attention to the 
downside outcomes associated with the option compared to the corresponding upside potentials 
as risk expected from the option (Denis et al., 1997, 1999).  
The loss aversion tendency of manager combined with the careful approach to 
acquisitions due to the risk bearing property of managerial ownership should positively 
contribute to the performance of takeovers. Moreover, managers tend to perceive the sizes of 
potential losses as more important than their probability (March & Shapira, 1987; Shimizu, 
2007). For managers with higher managerial ownership, the impact size of loss caused by M&A 
would be larger than otherwise. Hence, managers with higher stock ownership would select 
targets more carefully and be more stringent in giving premiums for the targets (Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, & Raman, 2001; Lewellen, Loderer, & Rosenfeld, 1985). Therefore, 
 
H4b. The higher the ownership levels of managerial ownership in a particular firm, the 
higher the M&A performance in the merger wave in the late 1990s. 
 
Some scholars focus on the convexity of a stock option‘s payoff and suggest stock 
options as a remedy for the managerial loss aversion problem (Sanders, 2001a; Sanders & 
Hambrick, 2007; Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002). Accordingly, the impact of stock 
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options should be separated from the total impact of managerial ownership when one tests the 
impact of stock ownership on risk taking in acquisition. The underlying logic is that an option‘s 
payoff structure rewards upside gains without any penalty on downside losses and thus provides 
downside protection for managers. Due to this property, stock options should reduce the gap in 
terms of risk profile and potentially motivate managers to take more risk. For a sounder 
grounding in the relationship between option plans and risk profile of managers, however, we 
should take into account the structure of a manager‘s total wealth portfolio. Even though 
increasing variance of stock returns increases the option value, the increased variance would 
bring a negative effect into manager‘s remaining capital invested around the focal firm‘s asset. 
Hence, the net effect driven by the option plan may be negligible (Lambert et al., 1991; Lambert 
et al., 1993). Furthermore, the endogenous relationship between the total equity stakes held by 
managers and stock options in their compensation contracts makes it difficult to tease out the 
impact of stock option from the total impact of managerial ownership. Hence, this paper also 
considers the relationship between total managerial ownership and acquisition risk. 
3.4 Governance by Monitoring 
Both capital structure and managerial ownership are static forms of corporate governance 
mechanisms. While they are very effective in setting up boundary conditions of managerial 
behavior in an ex-ante manner, they lack adaptability to changing situations. Given complex and 
confounding nature of firm performance, managers can display opportunistic behaviors such as 
manipulating structural factors and incentive system by exerting their positional power over 
when and what information to release, at least in the short term. That is why a strong governance 
mechanism should have robust monitoring mechanisms which can identify causal relationships 
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between managerial behaviors and firm performance and evaluate outcome attributable to 
managers (Blettner, Chaddad, & Bettis, 2012).   
However, a theoretical limitation inherent monitoring is ―who monitors the monitor‖ 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). For example, in a legal sense, it is the board of directors who are 
supposed to monitor top level managers and to ratify important decisions. Then the issue 
becomes that who monitors the board of directors. Large owners seem to be in a better position 
to monitor managers and board of directors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), but the large owners may 
use their majority position in the firm to extract private benefits at the cost of small owners 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  Again the issue of who monitors the monitor arises. Indeed, the 
chain problem in monitoring – who monitors the monitor- is one of fundamental issue in 
corporate governance and in some sense constitutes an infinite regress. That‘s why corporate 
governance scholars have suggested the monitoring by institutional investors as one of the 
essential components of good governance guidelines (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011). Several 
characteristics which distinguish institutional investors from other types of investors are 
provided for the sound grounds of this positive expectation on institutional investors in corporate 
governance.  
A typical stock ownership position held by institutional investors is perceived as large 
enough for the monitoring benefits to outweigh the monitoring costs and to exert power to affect 
the choice of strategy (Connelly et al., 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2002), but not so liquid as to allow 
easy divestment without incurring block discounts (Pound, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Firm 
managers whose compensation is tied to stock price are also concerned by the stock price 
consequences of institutional investors‘ dumping of their stock. Consequently, managers are 
motivated to attend to the requests of institutional investors (Connelly et al., 2010; Edmans, 
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2009). Furthermore, institutional investors are typically far better positioned to utilize their 
combined ownership positions as a control mechanism. Coordinating mechanisms, such as 
Institutional Shareholder Services or Investor Responsibility Center, enable them to easily 
constitute a collective power even when the ownership stakes of any individual institution are not 
large enough relative to dominant insiders (Gillan & Starks, 2007a). At the same time, each 
ownership position is not large enough for an institution to privatize the benefits of control rights 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Based on the aforementioned characteristics of institutional investors, 
monitoring by institutional investors is considered the lynchpin that makes other governance 
mechanisms, such as boards of directors, work as intended. 
Collinear with the recognition of the pivotal role played by institutional investors, 
shareholdings by institutional investors have increased, and the ownership of the U.S. 
corporations has become substantially more concentrated in the hands of institutional investors 
(Gillan & Starks, 2007a; Holderness, 2009). Indeed, institutional investors account for more than 
75 percent of the trading in equities listed on the New York Stock Exchange (Karmel, 2004). In 
addition, regulations
2
 imposed on institutional investors‘ intervention in corporate control after 
the Great Depression, the prohibition of owning controlling stock and of undertaking joint efforts 
among institutional investors (Roe, 1991), have been weakened or eliminated to facilitate 
monitoring by institutional investors (Kaplan, 1997b). 
Contrary to the positive expectation regarding institutional investor‘s role in corporate 
governance (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Kaplan, 1997a; Roe, 1991), U.S. institutional investors 
have been seemingly passive in terms of direct involvement despite substantial relaxations of 
                                                          
2
 Two key legal restrictions are the Glass-Steagall Act, which separates commercial from investment banking, and 
the Securities Exchange Acts in 1933 and 1934 which prohibit collective actions among institutional shareholders 
outside of proxy systems (For more details, see Coffee 1991).   
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restrictions imposed on financial institutions and ownership concentrated in the hands of 
institutional investors (Davis, 2008; Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008, 2010). Through the SEC Acts in 
1992, Amendments to Proxy Rules Release No.34-31326 (October 16, 1992), the cost of 
coordinating shareholders and challenging management teams was lowered. Institutional 
investors no longer needed to gain pre-approval from the SEC by filing a detailed proxy 
statement. At any time they can communicate with each other as long as they report their 
communication to the SEC afterwards (Kaplan, 1997a)
3
. Institutional ownership has also 
increased up to more than 50% of publicly traded firms and accounts for 75% of the trading in 
equities listed on the NYSE (Karmel, 2004). It is now no longer illegal for a group of 
coordinated institutional investors to exert control power. However, financial institutions in U.S. 
are still more likely to exit than to exercise voice and rarely hold large ownership blocks for as 
long as 5 years (Davis, 2008). Actually, even for mergers that resulted in negative acquirer 
returns, more than 95% of mutual funds voted for the mergers (Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008). 
3.4.1 Agency Perspective  
Recently, in finance, some scholars (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans 
& Manso, 2011) reframe ‗exit‘ as another form of ‗voice‘, not as a form of giving up their 
control right to intervene. For individual institutional investors, direct involvement as a way of 
governance, such as initiating proxy voting and submitting a shareholder proposal, is not an 
efficient way to bring changes in terms of corporate governance. Time-consuming and legally 
delicate processes and uncertain outcomes make the costs of such direct actions higher. It makes 
more economic sense for individual institutional investors to sell stocks when they obtain 
                                                          
3 According to Kaplan (1997), the Business Roundtable and other management organizations were extremely 
 hostile to this rule change when it was proposed. 
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negative private information, and vice versa (Maug, 1998). Individual institutional investors 
abandon their ongoing control rights by selling, but the governance mechanism of market prices 
is still working and impacted by their sale (Edmans, 2009). Trading incorporates the private 
information obtained by institutional investors into the stock price and the stock price becomes a 
more efficient indicator, reflecting the fundamental value of the firm more fully. With a more 
accurate valuation, the market for corporate control works more efficiently. Less competent 
managers are exposed to higher risk of being acquired (Edmans, Goldstein, & Jiang, 2012; 
Jensen & Ruback, 1983). This development is called ―governance by trading‖ (Edmans & Manso, 
2011). In this framework, frequent and active trading by more informed institutional investors 
should be interpreted as one of the active forms of indirect intervention by institutional investors 
through the pricing mechanism (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009). 
3.4.2 Behavioral Perspective  
However, strategy scholars and others who highlight the behavioral characteristics of 
trading by institutional investors are skeptical of the assertion that institutional investors are 
more informed investors than other types of investors and that their trading contributes more to 
the effectiveness of the market price in terms of delivering the voice of investors and disciplining 
managers. First of all, unlike family or other large block-holders, institutional investors hold 
widely diversified portfolios often including stocks of hundreds of companies (Bushee, 2004a). 
Hence, the institution cannot pay sufficient attention to any available private information for the 
individual firms (Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes, & Khan, 2008). Furthermore, lower fund fees 
due to the competitive nature of the fund industry make it even harder for institutional investors 
to bear the substantial costs of monitoring and gathering private information. Money managers 
who are hired by institutional investors and mainly compensated on the basis of an annual fee are 
38 
 
rarely motivated to pay private monitoring costs unless the activities incurring costs bring direct 
improvements in the performance of funds composed of hundreds of firm stocks (Coffee, 1991; 
Woidtke, 2002).  
Then what factors characterize the trading decisions of institutional investors if their 
trading is not triggered by private information? Trading of institutional investors is often 
triggered by quantifiable public information, for example quarterly financial performance, rather 
than by private information (Bushee, 2004a). As the degree of diversification increases, the 
attention of institutional investors turns away from detailed information of products and markets 
toward general statement of financial results like top management teams in highly diversified 
conglomerates (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011; Michel & Hambrick, 1992). Indeed, it is difficult 
and expensive for institutional investors to gather private information for use in trading any 
particular firm stock, so they are very attentive to recent quantitative public information and 
often make important and perhaps questionable inferences from the information. They tend to 
linearly extrapolate the recent short-term performance in setting their expectations for long-term 
performance without taking into account non-linear and uncertain properties of firm performance 
(Mishina et al., 2010). As a consequence, they often have expectations that are overly optimistic, 
leading to high market-to-book ratios, when they face positive earnings surprises (Cowen, 
Groysberg, & Healy, 2006; Skinner & Sloan, 2002). But at the same time, when they run into 
negative earnings surprises, they show asymmetrically large negative price response to the 
negative news (Veronesi, 1999). 
Another factor to characterize trading behavior of institutional investors is herding. 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) studied the herd behavior of institutional money managers in 
making trading decisions. According to Sharfstein and Stein, herding—―mimicking the behavior 
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of others rather than responding to their private information (p477)‖—is rational for money 
managers who are concerned about their reputation in the labor market even though it is 
inefficient from a social perspective. For example, consider a situation where a money manager 
has positive private information, while the others have negative public information on the same 
firm. If the money manager responds to his positive private information by purchasing the stock, 
in the short term he will be punished by the selling behaviors of the others. The punishment can 
harm his reputation in the labor market substantially until enough time has passed for his 
formerly private information reaches the market. Therefore, it can make sense for money 
managers to herd rather than to deviate from the popular directionality. This herding behavior 
has often been recognized as a partial cause of excessive stock market volatility (Lant, 1992; 
Porta, 1996). How then does the emphasis on quantifiable public information and herding among 
institutional investors affect strategic choice of the firms that are contained in the portfolios of 
institutional investors?  
The most updated, easily accessible and reliable quantifiable public information normally 
released by public firms is quarterly earnings releases. Institutional investors heavily rely on 
quarterly earnings releases in their trading decision making. In fact, the sensitivity of institutional 
investors to quarterly earnings releases and subsequent turnover ratio are very high (Bushee, 
2001b). From the perspective of behavioral theory (Bromiley, 2010; Cyert & March, 1963; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the amplified emphasis on quarterly earnings releases is a 
phenomenon to be attended to. It makes the interaction between performance feedback and 
subsequent adaptation of reference points occur more frequently. In other words, with strong 
emphasis on quarterly earnings releases, reference points adjust quarterly rather than yearly 
(Lant, 1992; Porta, 1996). As a consequence, managers perceive quarterly performance as an 
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independent time unit for reliable performance feedback, not just as one milestone for fulfilling a 
yearly business plan. This increased weight given to short-term (quarterly) performance 
substantially affects risk-taking and investment time frame. Even though the firm shows 
improved performance on a yearly basis, the firm managers who expect quarterly earnings 
shortfall would take more risks and initiate a search for new solutions. They also will pay more 
attention to searching for solutions which could affect firm performance in the short-term 
(Benner & Ranganathan, 2012; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003; Souder & Shaver, 2010). Going 
from annual to quarterly performance feedback and increased search for short-term solutions are 
typical indications of myopic management (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2011). 
3.4.3 Heterogeneity among Institutional Investors 
In juxtaposing the two conflicting views on institutional investors in the context of an 
M&A wave, I take into account behavioral heterogeneity within institutional investors by using 
modified Bushee‘s (1998, 2001b, 2004b) classification.4 Based on the degree of diversification, 
the turnover frequency of portfolios of institutional investors, and sensitivity to quarterly 
earnings releases, Bushee categorizes institutional investors into ―dedicated‖ and ―transient‖ 
institutional investors.
5
 Dedicated institutional investors are investors who have concentrated 
portfolios over time with intense monitoring, while transient institutional investors are investors 
                                                          
4
 Bushee‘s classification (1998, 2004) starts with nine variables describing the past investment behavior of 
institutional investors. Four of these variables—concentration, average percentage holding, large block percentage, 
and Herfindahl—measure the degree of diversification of an institutional investor‘s portfolio. Two variables—
turnover and stability—measure the extent of the institutional investor‘s portfolio turnover. The remaining three 
variables are all about trading sensitivity to quarterly earnings release. A k-means cluster analysis on these factors 
let institutional investors separated into three groups, ―transient,‖ ―dedicated,‖ and ―quasi-indexer.‖ According to 
Bushee (2004), during the period 1983–2002, transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexers accounted for 31%, 8%, and 
61% of institutional investors respectively. Quasi-indexers, the majority of institutional investors, fall somewhere 
between ―dedicated‖ and ―transient‖ institutional investors. 
 
5
 By eliminating the middle group, quasi-indexers, I explored the two major types of institutional investors, 
dedicated and transient, which are clearly differentiated. Actually, quasi-indexers are characterized by high 
ownership stability and small ownership stake.  
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who have broad portfolios and make frequent trades in response to quarterly earnings releases. 
Recently, some management scholars who used a modification of Bushee‘s categorization found 
significant differences between these two categories regarding individual firm-level decision 
making such as strategic choice (Connelly et al., 2010) and CEO compensation (Dharwadkar et 
al., 2008).  
Advantages of Bushee‘s classification, compared to the usual classification based on the 
legal type of institutional investor, are that Bushee‘s classification mainly focuses on the 
behavioral characteristics of institutional investors and is classified by year. For example, even in 
the case of public pension funds, which are not subject to panic surges in withdrawals and 
supposed to act as protectors of long-term pension holder‘s wealth, ―short-termism‖ still counts 
to some public pension funds. Within some of these funds, the market performance of each 
manager is compared to their peers and against market averages on a regular basis. Those whose 
market performance lags behind comparable internal or external funds are likely to be replaced 
by other managers. Hence, money managers employed by pension funds which use such 
evaluation processes are sensitive to short-term performance (Coffee, 1991). As a consequence, 
even some public pension funds often act more as traders rather than owners and thus encourage 
myopic behavior of firms within their portfolio (Drucker, 1976; Porter, 1992). Bushee‘s 
classification captures this behavioral heterogeneity both across and within legal classifications 
of institutional investors. Furthermore, yearly assessment captures changes in institutional 
investors‘ trading behavior and preferences over time. Given the boom and bust property of the 
merger wave in the 1990s, yearly assessment is more appropriate in addressing the heterogeneity 
of institutional investors. 
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3.4.4 Hypothesis Development 
Baseline hypothesis: General impact of institutional investors on M&A activities 
In relating the impact of institutional ownership on acquisition risk, scholars have 
emphasized the encouragement of risk taking due to the involvement of risk neutral institutional 
investors. Firm managers prefer low-risk strategies that preserve job security, as their human 
capital is invested in only one firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). For the 
risk-averse firm managers, takeovers are risky projects compared to internal capital expenditure 
due to the relatively higher uncertainty of acquisition outcomes (Jensen & Ruback, 1983), non-
routineness, restricted use of information, and speed of decision making inherent to acquisition 
processes involving the inter-organizational level(Jemison et al., 1996). However, institutional 
investors with more diversified portfolios than firm managers prefer risk-neutral strategies. 
Hence, the strong presence of institutional investors could lead to a preference of high risk-
taking strategy. This encouragement of firm risk taking has been identified as one of typical 
means taken by which institutional investors seek value maximization (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
Based on these arguments, I hypothesize: 
 
H5. On average, the higher the ownership levels of institutional investors in a particular 
firm, the higher the likelihood of the firm being an acquisition bidder. 
 
In relating the impact of institutional ownership to the performance of M&As, some 
scholars have highlighted the capability of institutional investors to encourage a search for 
profitable targets and to discourage M&As driven by managerial ego. The close scrutiny of 
target firms conducted by active institutional investors who have ownership stakes large enough 
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to bear substantial search costs (Hansen & Hill, 1991) discourages value-destroying takeovers 
driven by managerial hubris (Roll, 1986) or free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Hence, the monitoring 
of institutional investors was suggested as a necessary condition of superior M&A performance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
 
H6. On average, the higher the ownership levels of institutional investors in a 
particular firm, the higher the M&A performance. 
Hypotheses Based on Behavioral Perspective 
When we consider the sensitivity to quarterly earnings releases and the resultant portfolio 
turnover ratio between transient and dedicated institutional investors, the contribution of 
transient institutional investors to the proclivity to enter into merger waves is higher than of 
dedicated institutional investors. In particular, during the merger wave in the late 1990s, 
managers of firms with a strong presence of transient institutional investor were under more 
intense pressure to show strong quarterly performance consecutively to justify heightened 
aspirations caused by generally overvalued stock prices (Jensen, 2005). Consistent favorable 
quarterly performance feedback can cause the reference points to also adjust upward 
consecutively(Cowen et al., 2006). Furthermore, excessively optimistic expectations of investors, 
shaped by a tendency to extrapolate current trends and herding behaviors among transient 
institutional investors, eventually imposed an aspiration level unjustified by current operating 
performance and unattainable by organic growth alone (Mishina et al., 2010). If managers fail to 
meet these inflated goals, their wealth and managerial position and reputation were likely to be 
damaged by massive price drops resulting from the exit of disappointed transient institutional 
investors. The impact of the penalty driven by unexpected negative news is more salient and 
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potent than that of positive news with the objectively same magnitude due to a negativity bias 
(Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Indeed, research in finance has found that unexpected negative 
information is disproportionately influential (Skinner & Sloan, 2002; Veronesi, 1999). Given 
overoptimistic expectational errors of transient institutional investors to good news and negative 
bias of the markets, managers would start conducting problematic search, including probably 
value-destroying M&As, when they expect quarterly earnings shortfall.  
 
H7a. The higher the ownership levels of transient institutional investors in a particular 
firm, the higher the likelihood of the firm being an acquisition bidder in the merger wave in the 
late 1990s. 
 
If the H7a is supported,  
H7b. The marginal impact of transient institutional investors on M&A propensity is 
higher than that of dedicated institutional investors.   
 
Behavioral characteristics of transient institutional investors also affect the ability of 
transient institutional investors to provide quality monitoring on M&As (Coffee, 1991; 
Dharwadkar et al., 2008). The short-term investment horizon of transient institutional investors 
also makes it difficult for the investors to hold their position until the benefits and risks of the 
takeovers are fully realized, while dedicated institutional investors with long-term investment 
horizons can afford to stay and enjoy the full benefits and costs. Transient institutional investors 
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often take the ―Wall Street Walk‖6 after they obtain a certain target level of profitability. 
Therefore, the managers in the firm held by investors with short-term investment horizon, such 
as transient institutional investors, are not subject to thorough monitoring on the appropriateness 
of premium given to targets and the long-term performance of the deal.  
A short-term investment time horizon and the resultant shallow monitoring lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H8a. The higher the ownership levels of transient institutional investors in a particular 
firm, the lower the M&A performance in the merger wave in the late 1990s.  
 
If H8a is supported, 
H8b. The negative impact of transient institutional investors on M&A performance is 
higher than that of dedicated institutional investors.  
Hypotheses based on agency perspective 
However, theory on the disciplinary effect of smart trading by institutional investors 
predicts a different outcome under the condition of market-wide overvaluation. The presence of 
transient institutional investors makes the share price move toward fundamental value through 
smart trading using private information obtained by quality search (Edmans, 2009; Edmans & 
Manso, 2011). Through these transactions, more private information is impounded into the price. 
Hence, the stock is less likely to be overvalued at that time compared to market averages. 
                                                          
6
 The underlying notion of the ―Wall Street Walk‖ was that financial institutions should support and vote with 
management or sell their shares. This informal rule of behavior traces to guideline developed in the 1940s by the 
American Bankers Association (Coffee 1991). 
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Therefore, the probability of the firm taking advantage of the overvaluation window was lower 
than for firms with high ownership stake held by dedicated institutional investors. 
 
H9a.  The higher the ownership levels of transient institutional investors in a particular 
firm, the lower the likelihood of the firm being an acquisition bidder in the merger wave in the 
late 1990s. 
 
If the H9a is supported,  
H9b. The negative marginal impact of transient institutional investors on M&A 
propensity is higher than that of dedicated institutional investors.   
 
Furthermore, monitoring by multiple institutional investors at the market level is 
supposed to provide a reliable safeguard for shareholder‘s wealth even in the context of M&As. 
The occurrence or announcement of seemingly value-destroying mergers causes a decline in 
share price associated with aggressive trading by transient institutional investors (Admati & 
Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009). Even though the ―Wall Street Walk‖ relieves managers from 
direct oppositions or involvement by transient institutional investors who took the option of exit, 
the lowered share price facilitates more ownership building by transient institutional investors 
(Maug, 1998). In turn, managers are still subject to the threat of exit from newly entered transient 
institutional investors. If managers are consistently not attentive to the threats of exits, the price 
keeps dropping with recursive aggressive trading by transient institutional investors. Hence, at 
some point the owners of target firms would be less likely to accept the stock of acquiring firms 
as an appropriate medium of exchange. Moreover, the acquiring firms are exposed to higher risk 
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of being the target of disciplinary mergers even though they succeeded in acquiring the target 
firms (Edmans et al., 2012). Due to the disciplinary effect by trading, the ownership level of 
transient institutional investors contributes to higher bidder‘s return. 
 
H10a. The higher the ownership levels of transient institutional investors in a 
particular firm, the higher the M&A performance in the merger wave in the late 1990s.  
 
If H10a is supported,  
H10b. The positive impact of transient institutional investors on M&A performance is 
higher than that of dedicated institutional investors. 
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Chapter 4 DATA AND METHEDOLOGY 
4.1 Sample and Data 
Four datasets, Securities Data Corporation (SDC), Compustat, Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), and CDA/Spectrum Thomson Financial 13F database, were used to 
construct samples to test hypotheses. First, I extracted all M&A deals from SDC for the period 
1990–2009 with a transaction value of at least $1 million. I did not exclude M&A trials which 
failed to complete the deal in testing the hypothesis on the propensity to engage in M&As. By 
including these trials, I can mitigate the problem of selection bias. In testing M&A performance, 
I included only those M&A deals involving more than 50 percent of the target stock after the 
M&A transaction. Second, I calculated the abnormal stock returns of M&As from CRSP. Hence, 
the sample included only M&A deals conducted by publicly traded firms in the U.S. Third, I got 
the financial information of acquiring firms from Compustat. The firm-year observations for 
which I could not find the one-year lagged financial information in Compustat were excluded. 
Lastly, I got the institutional holdings data on acquiring firms from Thomson Financial 13F 
database. I excluded the firm-year observations that I could not find in Thomson Financial 13F 
database.
1
  
                                                          
11
 Before excluding the data points, I randomly selected around 20 firm-years for which institutional holdings do not 
appear in the Thomson Financial 13F database. I checked their ownership structure in another dataset, Capital IQ, 
which provides corporate ownership only in recent years but more detailed information. As a result I found that 
institutional investors have some stakes in those missing firm-year observations. The omission is partially because 
the institutional managers do not meet the entire 13F filing requirements or partially because the small proportion of 
the investment in those firms to the total portfolio of the institutional investor. The investment in each firm in the 20 
sample accounts for less than 1 percent of the total portfolio owned by the institutional investors. However, 
sometimes the level of institutional holdings to the total market cap of the focal firm was close to 20 percent. On this 
basis, I decided to exclude those firm-year observations which do not appear in the 13F datasets. 
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I also excluded financial service industries (SIC codes 6000–6999) since they have 
different asset structures than other industries, and stock market reactions can differ for these 
industries. These screening processes lead to 33,239 firm-year observations (6,700 firms) to test 
the hypothesis on propensity to engage in M&As and 5,201 M&A events to test the hypothesis 
on M&A performance.  
After I tested the impact of cash holdings and institutional ownership, I added 
Execucomp to the previous dataset to check the impact of managerial ownership. Execucomp 
provides the percentage of shares owned by each member of the top management team for each 
year. I summed these by firm-year to build a total measure of managerial ownership for a firm-
year. The Standard & Poor‘s Execucomp database includes approximately 2,500 active and 
inactive firms in the S&P 1500 index, plus a handful of additional firms. And Execucomp only 
covers the S&P 1500 since 1993. Therefore, the sampling period of this data set cover from 1993 
to 2006. Execucomp data is compiled from annual company proxy statements Compensation 
data on the top five executives of each company are typically reported each year, although as 
many as nine are sometimes shown depending on company reporting in proxy statements. 
4.2 Variables  
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
There are two dependent variables. The dependent variable for the models to test the 
likelihood of being a bidder firm is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the company announces an 
M&A transaction that year and 0 otherwise. 
The dependent variable of models to test the hypothesis on M&A performance is 
cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) relates to the announcement of the acquisition. To 
calculate CAR, I first obtained daily abnormal returns (AR) for each firm. Next, following 
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standard practice, I accumulated the AR for a period of four days—the two days before (-2), the 
day of the announcement of the deal, and the day after the announcement (+1). Although longer 
event periods would ensure that I captured all effects, the estimates would be less reliable. 
Following prior literatures, I weighted the CARs by the market value of the firm at the beginning 
day of the event windows.
2
 
4.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
Cash Holdings 
Additions to cash reserves occur when managers accumulate free cash flow rather than 
spending it immediately. Therefore, excess cash holdings mean more than a proxy for firm 
performance. Excess cash reserves are stockpiled free cash flow. Concordantly, the predicted 
relationship between cash holdings and takeover decisions based on the FCF hypothesis is 
positive (Harford, 1999). Indeed, Jensen (1986, 1989) focused on the cumulative cash balance 
rather than the yearly cash flow when he criticized the managerial misbehavior. Jensen (1986) 
also recognizes merger and acquisitions as a primary method by which managers can spend 
accumulated free cash flow instead of paying it out to shareholders. By doing so, managers are 
able to reduce their personal undiversified risk or expand their authority even though the 
takeovers are not value increasing for shareholders. Cash reserve is measured by cash and short-
term investments (CHE) divided by total assets (AT). 
Managerial Ownership 
The level of managerial ownership is measured by the percentage of equity owned by the 
top managers. I attained executive-firm-years (the percentage of shared owned by each top 
                                                          
2
 For robustness check, I verified the method for calculating CARs by incorporating CRSP equally weighted index 
which ignores the heterogeneity in the market capitalization of firms included in the index rather than using CRSP 
value weighted index. However, this treatment does not impact the interpretation of main result of this paper.  
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manager for each year) from Execucomp. I then summed these executive-firm-years to build a 
total measure of firm-year total managerial ownership. 
Institutional Ownership 
The level of institutional ownership is measured by the number of common stock shares 
held by institutional investors, calculated as the percentage of the total number of shares 
outstanding for a focal firm at the fourth quarter one year prior to the merger announcement. The 
level of transient institutional investors’ ownership and the level of dedicated institutional 
investors’ ownership are calculated as percentages of common stock owned by transient 
institutional investors and dedicated institutional investors, respectively. I classified institutional 
investors by the data provided by Bushee‘s homepage into transient, dedicated, and quasi-
indexer. As I mentioned earlier, by eliminating the middle group, quasi-indexers, I explored the 
two major types of institutional investors, dedicated and transient, which are clearly 
differentiated.  
The period of merger wave in the l990s 
I defined 1995–2000 as the period of the merger wave (Period 0) in the late 1990s. To 
identify the merger wave, I first checked year-fixed effects (base year is 2005) for the likelihood 
of being a bidder in an M&A announcement with standard control variables on M&As.
3
 The 
year-fixed effects from 1995 to 2000 were significant. Prior studies on merger waves also 
reported that most merger waves they identified occurred during this time period (Haleblian et al., 
2012; Harford, 2005). For example, Harford (2005) identified 24 industry merger waves (SIC 
two-digit level) in the 1990s. According to him, 23 of 24 industry merger waves in the 1990s 
                                                          
3
 If M&A occurs, the binary variable for the firm-year observation is 1. Otherwise, it is 0. I changed base year for 
robustness. The results are similar except when the base year is 2009. Due to financial crisis in 2009, when the base 
year is 2009, every year-fixed effect is significant.  
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started between 1995 and 2000. The remaining merger wave occurred in 1992.
4
 Haleblian et al. 
(2012) also identified 12 industry merger waves (SIC four-digit level) from 1984 to 2004 by 
using the method developed by Harford (2005). Of the 12, 10 happened between 1995 and 2000. 
One of the remaining two occurred in the 1980s, and the other occurred in 1992. 
I divided the years in the sample, 1990–2009, into four periods.5 The four periods cover 
1990 to 1994(Period 1), 1995 to 2000(Period 0), 2001 to 2004(Period 2), and 2005 to 
2009(Period3), respectively.
6
 By analyzing the role played by institutional investors during those 
four periods and institutional ownership, I traced how the presence of institutional investors 
impact the M&A decision of the firms within their portfolio regarding M&As as they 
experienced boom and busts triggered by market overvaluation and technological shock, such as 
the Internet.  
4.2.3 Control Variables 
Firm characteristics 
I control for a variety of acquiring firm specific variables that are standard controls when 
M&A propensity or performance is the dependent variable to isolate ownership effects. All the 
control variables for firm characteristics were measured one year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. 
Market valuation—Tobin’s Q  
                                                          
4
 To identify merger waves, he first constructed simulated distributions of acquisition by randomly assigning each of 
acquisitions to one of the years. He repeated the simulation 1000 times. Finally, he compared the simulated 
distribution of M&A deals with the real distribution of M&A deals. If each wave exceeded the 95th percentile in the 
simulated distribution set (based on 1000 simulations), it was identified as a merger wave. 
 
5
 It is also plausible to test the interaction effects between year fixed effects and independent variables, such as 
institutional ownership, without classifying years into four periods. Due to the limited M&A occurrence of each year, 
however, a large magnitude of coefficients doesn‘t lead to statistical significance.  
 
6
 I changed the length of each period marginally, such as defining the merger wave period from 1995 to 1999. 
However, those treatments do not change the substantial results of this paper. 
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The firm‘s relative market valuation is likely to influence acquisition activities. However, 
the direction of this effect is not conclusive. On the one hand, higher market valuation is 
positively related to acquisition activity because firms highly valued by the market may be more 
likely to use their inflated stock to finance acquisitions. However, Tobin‘s Q is also an indicator 
of growth opportunities within the firm. Therefore, higher Tobin‘s Q may be negatively related 
with acquisition activities given the lower needs of importing growth opportunities from outside. 
Regardless of the direction, to control for this impact of relative market valuation, I used Tobin‘s 
Q. Following Brush, Bromily, and Hendrickx (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000), market 
value is the sum of calendar-year end
7
 values of the firm‘s common stock (PRCC_C*CSHO), 
market value of the firm‘s preferred stock (PSTK), book value of the firm‘s long-term debt 
(DLTT), and book value of the firm‘s short-term debt with a maturity less than one (DD1). The 
market value is scaled by total assets (AT).  
Size  
Firm size has been associated with acquisition activity and abnormal return. I controlled 
for firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of firm assets. 
FCF—undistributed cash flow:  
According to the FCF hypothesis, firms with FCF tend to invest in low-return or even 
negative-return projects (Jensen, 1986). As a control for the FCF effect, I used undistributed 
yearly cash flow scaled by total assets. I follow Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and define 
undistributed cash flow as operating income before depreciation (OIBDP), minus total income 
taxes (TXT), minus the changes in deferred taxes from the previous year to the current year 
(changes in TXDITC), minus gross interest expenses on total debt (XINT), minus the total 
                                                          
7
 In our econometric model, we use year fixed effect. Therefore, we use calendar-year end values of the firm‘s 
common stock (Brush et al., 2000). We also run a regression model based on fiscal-year end values of the firm‘s 
common stock. This treatment does not affect the interpretation of the main results of this paper. 
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amount of preferred dividend requirement on cumulative preferred stock and dividends paid on 
non-cumulative preferred stock (DVP), minus the total dollar amount of dividends declared on 
common stock (DVC). Cash flow is scaled by total assets (AT). 
Leverage  
I include the leverage ratio, LR, to control for the effect of debt on the propensity to 
engage in M&A activities and M&A performance. According to agency theory, the leverage 
ratio is negatively related with propensity to engage in M&As, but positively related with M&A 
performance. LR is defined as the firm‘s total debt (DLTT+DLC) divided by total assets (AT). 
Growth  
Growth opportunities within the firm are negatively related to propensity to engage in 
M&As, but positively related with M&A performance. To control for the impact of growth on 
the propensity and performance of M&As, we follow Brush et al. (2000) and define growth rate 
as ln(SalesJ,T/Sales J,T-1).  
Prior performance  
Prior performance is closely related to a firm‘s strategic decision making, such as 
engaging in M&As. However, the direction is ambiguous. Managerial hubris (Roll, 1986) 
established by good prior performance would encourage acquisition activities, while managers in 
poorly performing firms have incentives to try something new, such as buying new businesses 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). To control for these diverging impacts of prior performance on 
acquisition activities and the resultant deal performance, I used return on equity net income (NI) 
scaled by shareholder‘s equity (SEQ).  
Type of acquisitions  
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Prior literatures on M&A performance have shown that relatedness of acquisitions 
(Amihud, Dodd, & Weinstein, 1986b; Lane et al., 1998) and the use of cash as the medium of 
exchange (Martin, 1996) for the M&A transactions are positively related with M&A 
performance. However the degree of competitiveness of the deal is negatively related with M&A 
performance (Chang, 1998). The control variables related with type of acquisitions were used 
only for the model to test M&A performance. In testing the M&A propensity, I checked how 
institutional ownership affects the propensity to engage in cash deals or horizontal deals by using 
dummy variables indicating cash deal or horizontal deal as dependent variables. 
Relatedness of acquisition  
I controlled for the relatedness of acquisition by including an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the bidder and the target belongs to the same industry, specified by the two-digit SIC code, and 
0 otherwise (Andrade et al., 2001).  
Medium of exchange  
I controlled for the medium of exchange for the M&A transactions by including an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the percent of cash payment is higher than 70 percent of total 
transaction value and 0 otherwise
8
 (Harford, 2005). 
Degree of competitiveness  
I controlled for the degree of competitiveness of the deal by including an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the number of bidders is more than 1 and 0 otherwise. In my sample, only 
120 M&As have multiple bidders.  
Industry effects  
I included industry dummy variables to control for systematic differences across 
industries (Haleblian et al., 2012).  
                                                          
8
 Of the 7,776 cash deals, the medium of exchange in the 7,137 deals is 100 percent cash.   
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4.3 Analytic Models 
To test the hypotheses on the propensity to engage in M&As, logistic regression with 
random effects was employed as the analytic model. An advantage of logit models over probit 
models in panel structure is that the random effects logit models don‘t require any assumption on 
how the error term is related to independent variables unlike the probit random effects model. 
Due to this advantage, there is no systematic difference between a random-effect and fixed-effect 
logit model in a statistical sense (Wooldridge, 2002). Given the higher efficiency of random-
effects model over fixed-effects model, random effect logit model is employed.  
To test the hypotheses on M&A performance, I used an OLS regression with industry and 
period fixed effects. This allows me to control for idiosyncratic industry and temporal 
differences that are not accounted for by the control variables. The remaining issue is how to 
take into account the clustering of observations on multiple bidders that conduct multiple M&As 
in the same year (e.g., Cisco). Using conventional standard errors which ignores the firm-specific 
correlation will lead to imprecise inference. I corrected for this by using firm-clustered standard 
errors. These clustered standard errors are larger than those obtained from conventional 
estimation thereby making the statistical inference more conservative. Please note that obtaining 
firm-clustered standard errors is equivalent to modeling random effects in the panel structure.  
A selection problem may arise when I estimate the influence of (transient or dedicated) 
institutional ownership on M&A performance, because the sample consists only of firm-years 
which engage in M&As and these firm-years may differ in important unmeasured ways from 
those which do not engage in M&As. This means that the error term in the M&A performance 
equation (outcome equation) may be correlated with the error term in the M&A propensity 
equation (selection equation). This selection bias is equivalent to an omitted variable bias. 
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Heckman (1979) suggests a two-stage procedure to solve the sample-selection problem. I added 
mutual fund outflow and industry average institutional holdings to the selection equation. These 
added variables were not included in the outcome equation. Mutual fund outflow is borrowed 
from Edmans et al. (2012). The idea is that with the sudden substantial outflows by mutual fund 
investors, more than 5 percent of a particular fund‘s total assets, the funds should sell some 
portion of their holdings to repay investors who wish to redeem their investment. This exogenous 
sudden drop of institutional holdings leads to downward price pressure. This price pressure 
decreases the propensity of the firm to engage in acquisition activities, especially stock-for-stock 
acquisition. 
Robustness Check 
An alternative explanation may arise in the possibility that the selection of transient 
institutional investors drives the probable positive relationship between transient institutional 
investors‘ ownership and M&A propensity, not the governance treatment (putting too much 
emphasis on short-term financial performance) by transient institutional investors. To address the 
alternative explanation, I ran the firm-fixed effect logit model and conducted a Hausman test. As 
Wooldridge(2002)  maintains, the Hausman test reports non-systematic difference between 
fixed- and random-effects logit models. It suggests that within-firm changes over time rather 
than between-firm variation probably highly correlated with the selection of institutional 
investors drove the results I find.  
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Chapter 5 RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.  
5.1 Cash Holdings 
The nested results of the four models of the impact of cash holdings on acquisition 
activities are shown in Table 2.  
The first model contains only cash holdings. The second model adds the level of 
institutional ownership to the first model. The third model adds the level of transient institutional 
ownership to the first model. The fourth model adds the level of dedicated institutional to the 
first model.  
As Table 2 reports, all the coefficients of cash holdings shows negative but insignificant 
relationship except for the coefficient in model 3. Only when transient institutional ownership is 
included as a control, the coefficient is marginally significant (at the level of 0.05). The 
coefficient of the interaction between cash holdings and period 2 is also marginally significant 
and positive with transient ownership, as H1b (hypothesis based on behavioral theory on M&A 
propensity) predicted. Given the non-linearity of logit function and the interpretation of the 
economic meaning of the coefficient, I checked the impact size of cash holdings in terms of the 
predicted probability of being a bidder with transient ownership as a control variable. As I 
increase the cash holdings ratio from 0 percent to 40 percent, the predicted probability of being a 
bidder decreased from 10.01 percent to 9.27 percent. Economic significance is not substantial.      
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The nested results of the three models of the impact of cash holdings on M&A 
performance are shown in Table 3. 
The first model contains institutional ownership as a control. The second and third have 
transient and dedicated ownership respectively. I am not able to find any significant relationship 
between cash holdings and M&A performance.  
In sum, I did not detect a strong relationship between cash holdings on M&A propensity 
and M&A performance. While such finding may be disappointing to the individual proponents of 
agency and behavioral perspective, notice that my proposed model was grounded in juxtaposing 
two competing perspectives, behavioral and agency theory, on the impact of cash holdings on 
M&A propensity and performance. It reveals the necessity of midrange view embracing agency 
perspective and behavioral perspective regarding cash holdings. A midrange view which 
incorporates both the benefit and costs side of cash holdings simultaneously would make it 
possible for ones to have a holistic perspective on the impact of cash holdings. And future 
research investigates more specific contingencies where benefits outpace costs of cash holdings 
or vice versa.  
5.2 Institutional Ownership 
The nested results of the five models of the impact of institutional ownership on 
acquisition activities are shown in Table 4.  
The first model contains only controls. The second model adds the level of institutional 
ownership to the first model. The third model adds the level of transient institutional ownership 
to the first model. The fourth model adds the level of dedicated institutional to the first model. 
The fifth model adds the level of transient and dedicated institutional ownership to the first 
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model. All the models with explanatory variables, regarding institutional ownership, show 
improved Wald Chi Square compared to that of Model 1, the controls-only model.  
The second model provides strong support for H5 (Baseline hypothesis on the impact of 
institutional ownership on M&A propensity), which relates the level of institutional ownership to 
acquisition activities positively. The coefficient of institutional ownership is positive and 
significant. Hence, the result suggests that institutional investors generally encourage M&A 
activities as the hypothesized theory predicts. Models 3, 4, and 5 supported H7a (A hypothesis on 
the impact of transient institutional ownership on M&A propensity based on behavioral 
perspective), which theorized a positive relationship between the levels of transient institutional 
ownership and the acquisition activities. Given the nonlinear nature of logit model, however, it is 
more useful to discuss the variables‘ marginal effect (Hoetker, 2007). Notice Table 4-1,1 which 
compares the marginal effect of (transient/dedicated) institutional ownership at the mean of all 
other independent variables during the merger wave in the late 1990s. The marginal impact of 
transient institutional investors on the log odds ratio of an outcome (in this study, the incidence 
of M&A announcement in a given year) is significantly higher than that of dedicated institutional 
investors, with no overlap between confidence intervals. Even though both transient and 
dedicated institutional investors encourage M&A activities, there is a significant difference in 
terms of magnitude between transient and dedicated institutional investors. Also note that the 
marginal effects of the continuous variable in Table 4-1 show the instantaneous rate of change by 
small amount increase of continuous independent variables. Hence, its interpretation largely 
depends on how the continuous variable is scaled. Furthermore, a constant change in odds ratio 
does not imply a constant change in probabilities again due to the nonlinear nature of logit 
                                                          
1
 I got the marginal effects in Table 2-1 after I ran the regression of Model 5, which includes transient and dedicated 
institutional ownership and their interaction with temporal effects, respectively.  
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(Hoetker, 2007). To facilitate the interpretation of marginal effects, I show the change in the 
predicted probability as the (transient/dedicated) institutional ownership increases in a graphical 
presentation with Table 4-1. If institutional ownership of a firm increases from 0 percent to 40 
percent (mean of institutional ownership is around 41%), the predicted probability to be a bidder 
increases from 8.8 percent to 14.3 percent with all other variables at their mean value. If transient 
institutional ownership increases from 0 percent to 40 percent, the probability increases from 
12.4 percent to 22.2 percent, while dedicated ownership increases the probability from 13.8 
percent to 17.6 percent. A high level of transient institutional ownership encourages M&A 
activities more than dedicated institutional investors, a supporting evidence for H7b (A 
hypothesis on the impact size of transient institutional ownership on M&A propensity compared 
to that of dedicated institutional ownership based on behavioral perspective). 
Notice the sub-sample analysis represented in Figure 1. Unlike OLS, the interpretation on 
interactions between two variables in a logit model becomes complicated again due to the 
nonlinear nature of logit model. Indeed, the magnitude and even the sign of the marginal effect 
can differ across observations (Hoetker, 2007). To investigate the temporal difference in terms of 
the governance role played by transient and dedicated institutional investors, I conducted sub-
sample analysis. While the impact of transient institutional investors on M&A occurrence is 
substantial, when stock market is in good times, such as 1995~2000 and 2005~2009, the impact 
was not so substantial when stock market is in bad times like from 2001~2004.  
The nested results of the five models of the impact of institutional ownership on M&A 
performance are shown in Table 5.  
The first model contains only controls. The second model adds the level of institutional 
ownership. The third model adds the level of institutional ownership and its interaction with 
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temporal effects to the first model. The fourth model adds the level of transient institutional 
ownership and its interaction with temporal effects to the first model. The fifth model adds the 
level of dedicated institutional ownership and its interaction with temporal effects to the first 
model. 
Model 2 in Table 5 does not find any statistical support of H6 (Baseline hypothesis on the 
impact of institutional ownership on M&A performance) that relates the level of institutional 
ownership and M&A performance in a positive way. The coefficient of institutional ownership is 
negative and significant. In period 3 (2005–2009); however, the negative impact of institutional 
investors on the M&A performance has decreased. In Models 4 and 5, I find a supporting 
evidence for H8a (A hypothesis on the impact of transient institutional ownership on M&A 
performance based on behavioral perspective). The level of transient institutional investors is 
negatively related to M&A performance. However, the level of dedicated institutional investors 
does not impact on M&A performance significantly, which is supporting evidence for H8b (A 
hypothesis on the impact size of transient institutional ownership on M&A performance 
compared to that of dedicated institutional ownership based on behavioral perspective). 
Transient institutional investors, in general, have a negative effect on M&A performances. 
Heckman‘s Lambda is not also significant. Hence, the results I found are not driven by selection 
bias. Table 6 provides the results of the Heckman‘s correction for selection bias.  
To find out the source of differential impact of transient and dedicated institutional 
investors on M&A performance, I ran the random effect logit regression on the propensity to 
engage in cash, non-public, and horizontal acquisitions. Since the nature and the performance of 
the acquisition depend on variables such as the medium of exchange, target public status, and 
relatedness between acquirer and target, the differential likelihood of being a bidder of different 
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type of acquisition would provide important clues to the differential impact of the two categories 
of institutional investors on M&A performance. The regression results are represented in Table 7.  
Interestingly, unlike the overall propensity to engage in M&As, dedicated institutional 
investors are more favorable toward cash mergers than transient institutional investors. While 
transient institutional investors encourage M&As generally, dedicated institutional investors are 
more selective in facilitating M&As. In spite of the chance to utilize overvalued stock price 
through stock-for-stock transactions, firms with strong presence of dedicated institutional 
investors prefer to use cash as the means of exchange. The dilution impact or the tendency to 
give higher premium in stock-for-stock acquisitions may cause firm managers with strong 
presence of dedicated institutional investors to select cash as the main medium of exchange for 
acquisitions. Firms with strong presence of dedicated institutional investors appear to have a 
more positive attitude toward more-related acquisitions than toward less-related acquisitions, 
while dedicated investors seem not to be supportive of the acquisitions of non-public targets. 
This differential preference regarding specific types of acquisitions in part accounts for the 
differential impact of transient and dedicated institutional investors on acquisition performance.  
5.3 Managerial Ownership 
The nested results of the four models of the impact of managerial ownership on 
acquisition activities are shown in Table 8.  
The first model contains only managerial ownership. The second model adds the level of 
institutional ownership to the first model. The third model adds the level of transient institutional 
ownership to the first model. The fourth model adds the level of dedicated institutional to the 
first model.  
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As Table 8 reports, all the coefficients of cash holdings show negative but marginally 
significant (at the level of 0.05) relationship except for the coefficient in model 2(with 
institutional ownership). The coefficients of the interaction between managerial ownership and 
periods are not significant. Given the non-linearity of logit function and the economic 
interpretation of the coefficient, I checked the impact size of managerial ownership in terms of 
the predicted probability of being a bidder. As I increase the managerial ownership from 0 
percent to 40 percent, the predicted probability of being a bidder decreased from 24.8 percent to 
24.7 percent. Economic significance is not substantial. 
The nested results of the three models of the impact of managerial ownership on M&A 
performance are shown in Table 9.  
The first model contains has institutional ownership as a control. The second and third 
has transient and dedicated ownership respectively. I am not able to find any significant 
relationship between managerial ownership and M&A performance.  
In sum, I did not detect a strong relationship between managerial ownership on M&A 
propensity and M&A performance. Again notice that my proposed model was grounded in 
juxtaposing two competing perspectives, behavioral and agency theory, on the impact of cash 
holdings on M&A propensity and performance. It also reveals the necessity of midrange view 
embracing incentive alignment effects based on agency perspective and risk bearing effects 
based on behavioral perspective regarding managerial ownership. A midrange view which 
incorporates both the alignment effects (benefit) and risk bearing effects (cost) of managerial 
ownership simultaneously would make it possible for ones to have a holistic perspective on the 
impact of managerial ownership.
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Chapter 6 IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
6.1 Implications 
This paper fails to find supporting evidence that higher managerial ownership or 
institutional investors are guardians of shareholders‘ wealth. Contrarily, the main results of this 
paper provide substantial evidence that short-term orientation of transient institutional investors 
facilitated an M&A wave which produced disappointing outcomes from the perspective of 
acquiring firm shareholders as the behavioral theory developed in here predicts. Institutional 
investor‘s frequent trading does not seem to play a disciplinary role in terms of monitoring 
managers during the merger wave. And the expected incentive alignment effect of managerial 
ownership seems to be offset by the unintended risk bearing effects of managerial ownership. 
Hence this paper fails to find any significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
M&A propensity and performance. Furthermore, this paper also fails to find any evidence 
supporting a positive relationship between cash holdings and value destroying M&As, such as 
empire building or conglomerate type of M&As.   
These results contribute to current understanding on corporate governance largely in four 
aspects.  
First, the finding of this paper provides additional evidence that governance reforms do 
not always serve firms or their shareholders well. Like the empirical results on the separation of 
CEO and board chair position (Ghoshal, 2005) and the restrictions on CEO outside directorship 
contrary to shareholders (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011), this paper also finds insignificant or 
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opposing evidence on some essential elements of the good governance guidelines, such as higher 
managerial ownership and the monitoring role of institutional investors. We need to revisit the 
basic assumption underlying recent corporate governance reforms inspired by agency theory. A 
key underlying assumption in reforming corporate governance is that it is internal agents‘ 
(usually managers) ego or interest that destroys shareholders‘ wealth. Therefore, the basic 
direction of resolution to the agency problems is to increase external pressure (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The upsurge of institutional investors, the subsequent relaxation of regulations 
that prohibited institutional investors from intervening inside corporate control, and the 
expansion of the market for corporate control are the exemplary means through which external 
pressure comes into the internal scene of corporate control (Kaplan, 1997b). The institutionalized 
external pressure from outside market participants including institutional investors and media 
seems to have succeeded in taming managerial discretionary power. However, the results of this 
paper identify a case where governance failure was driven by external pressure. In the strong 
presence of external pressure, even good managers were under too much tension on share price 
change induced by active trading by institutional investors. Hence, managers may increase risk 
taking in an attempt to avoid losses in the short term. Due to this problematic search driven by 
the manager‘s tendency of loss aversion, even M&As are overused by managers as the means to 
meet inflated growth expectations of external investors rather than as the market for corporate 
control to discipline managers. This type of acquisitions driven by external pressure leads to the 
wealth destruction of acquiring firm shareholder.  
Second, this paper suggests a mechanisms by which transient institutional investors bias 
managers of firms in their portfolio toward short horizons in their investment decisions by using 
the theory of adaptive aspirations originally developed by Cyert and March (1963). It has often 
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been implicitly assumed that managers are attentive to the appetite of external investors because 
external investors raise their voice through direct involvement in corporate governance processes, 
such as filing proposals or proxy fighting when they are dissatisfied with the firm performance. 
In most cases, however, institutional investors are passive in intervening even when the firm 
performance is disappointing (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008). The 
remaining issue is how we can explain the behaviors of managers that have changed substantially 
as institutional ownership has increased substantially. This paper provides a clue to explain this 
puzzle between seemingly passive institutional investors and managers‘ behavior attentive to the 
expectation of institutional investors. By showing the interactions between the aspiration of 
institutional investors and performance feedback at the market level, this paper identifies an 
important link between institutional investors‘ expectation and firm strategic choice.  
Third, as an extension of second point, the research suggests that more scholarly 
emphasis be put on understanding the quarterly earnings releases on the processes of corporate 
governance. Transient institutional investors attain their goal to affect managerial behaviors 
toward short-term benefits only by increasing the frequency of performance feedback from year 
to quarter without any further arrangement. Just by redefining the time span from year to quarter, 
managerial behaviors conform to the preference of transient institutional investors. As this paper 
shows, this reduction of time span does not necessarily leads to positive outcomes. The shortened 
time unit may facilitate some organizational misbehavior such as financial restatements and 
underinvestment on important long-term projects in strategic or technological sense. Actually, 
we are observe an upsurge of financial restatements after the late 1990s (Harris & Bromiley, 
2007; Mishina et al., 2010) even though institutional investor‘s ownership in the U.S has 
increased substantially since 1990. Benner and Ranganathan (2012) also identified strategic 
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underinvestment during the periods of three radical technological changes- Digital Camera, 
Online Newspaper, VOIP- after 1990. This dissertation provides the additional insight that 
transient institutional investors were also one cause of organizational misbehaviors identified in 
recent research (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012; Mishina et al., 2010).  
Fourth, this paper has not detected any economically significant impact of cash holdings 
which supports agency theory. It implies that higher cash holdings convey advantages as well as 
disadvantages (Kim and Bettis, 2013). As behavioral theory predicts (Cyert & March, 1963), 
cash holdings play a role of protecting organizational core not only from an economic bust but 
also from an economic boom when environment outruns usual aspiration-level adjustment like 
the boom in the late 1990s.    
The model developed here must be tested and refined in other contexts. M&A is a 
strategic option for managers to take in order to meet institutional investors‘ expectations. For 
example, myopic management regarding budget control or earnings management can be a 
context where the model regarding adaptive aspiration of institutional investors and subsequent 
problematic search of managers can be tested and refined (Gavetti et al., 2012). By doing so, the 
reform of corporate governance in the U.S. can be more effective in terms of balancing external 
pressure and internal autonomy. 
6.2 Limitations 
The scope of this dissertation has limitations suggesting several promising directions for 
future research. I take into account the heterogeneity within M&As by checking the relationship 
between the governance mechanism and M&A performance measured by cumulative abnormal 
return. By doing so, I address to the issue that a particular kinds of institutional investors 
encourages a specific type of M&As, such as value-enhancing or value-destroying M&As. In 
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addition to value implications measured by short-term market response, the development of 
long-term M&A performance measured by divestments of formerly acquired business units 
(Shimizu, 2007) or additional M&A in the same business sector would contribute to our 
understanding of the impact of transient institutional investors on the firm decision making at the 
context of M&As in the long-term.  
Second, this dissertation uses the Bushee‘s classification on institutional investors to take 
into account the heterogeneity within institutional investors. A traditional common approach to 
classifying institutions is by their legal type. A concern to use classifications based on legal type 
is that there is substantial variation within the same legal type in terms of investment horizons 
and sensitivity to short-term earnings release. For example, Dalton et al.(2003) define three types 
of institutional investors; pressure-resistant institutional investors (public pension funds, mutual 
funds, foundations and endowments), pressure-sensitive institutional investors (insurance 
companies, banks, and nonbank trusts) and pressure-indeterminate institutional investors 
(corporate pension funds). However, they failed to find any significant differences across the 
trichotomy of institutional investors. That‘s the motivation of using Bushee‘s classification- 
Dedicated, Transient, Quasi-Indexer- in this paper. According to Bushee (2004a), the three types 
of investment styles appear to be distributed fairly evenly across legal types. And recently some 
management scholars use Bushee‘s categorization and found significant differences among the 
categorizations(Connelly et al., 2010). An advantage of Bushee‘s classification is that all funds 
run by institutional investors are classified annually, so they can move between groups. This 
yearly assessment allows institutional investors‘ interest to change over time. Given the boom 
and bust property of the merger wave in interest, yearly assessment is more appropriate in 
addressing the heterogeneity of institutional investors.  
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Consequently, however, the results of this paper are subject to the limitations of Bushee‘s 
classifying techniques.  The future research based on a different classification scheme using legal 
type of institutional investors may provide a more robust insight on the monitoring role played 
by institutional investors at the M&A context. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (* p<0.05) 
 
  Mean S.D. M&A CAR Tobin's Q Size Growth Cash Leverage Cash flow 
M&A 0.195719 0.396757 1        
CAR 0.019874 0.099454 . 1       
Tobin's Q 1.888738 2.984415 0.0017 -0.0161 1      
Size 5.42226 2.097952 0.1135* -0.1086* -0.1663* 1     
Sales growth 0.092747 0.392577 0.0082 -0.0016 0.1209* 0.0064 1    
Cash reserves 0.184969 0.223238 -0.0271* 0.003 0.3136* -0.2940* 0.0498* 1   
Leverage 0.225502 0.250991 -0.0104* 0.006 -0.0676* 0.1939* -0.0442* -0.3521* 1  
Cash flow 0.019123 0.304454 0.0917* -0.0761* -0.2208* 0.2074* 0.0120* -0.2845* 0.0108* 1 
Net income -0.03621 0.504431 0.0437* -0.0416* -0.2137* 0.1889* 0.0748* -0.1469* -0.2251* 0.4693* 
Institution(Total) 0.410489 0.295813 0.1657* -0.1107* -0.0228* 0.5253* 0.0297* -0.0665* 0.0175* 0.1796* 
Institution(Tra) 0.103626 0.122804 0.1057* -0.0813* 0.0315* 0.2969* 0.0481* 0.0509* -0.0154* 0.0967* 
Institution(Ded) 0.06937 0.101222 0.0600* -0.0247* -0.0556* 0.1809* -0.0116* -0.0772* 0.0296* 0.0896* 
 
 
 
  Net income Institution(Total) Institution(Tra) Institution(Ded) 
Net income 1    
Institution(Total) 0.1120* 1   
Institution(Tra) 0.0519* 0.6368* 1  
Institution(Ded) 0.0580* 0.3478* 0.0887* 1 
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2 
Table 2. Cash Holdings—Propensity to Engage in M&As 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Dependent Variable M&A M&A M&A M&A 
Tobin's Q 0.0343*** 0.0024*** 0.0307*** 0.0343*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size 0.160*** 0.066*** 0.132*** 0.150*** 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
Growth -0.041 -0.054 -0.059 -0.039 
 (0.0506) (0.051) (0.0507) (0.051) 
Leverage - 0.200 - 0.157 - 0.200 - 0.195 
 (0.097) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) 
Cash flow 2.726*** 2.310*** 2.520*** 2.700*** 
  (0.164) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) 
Net -0.0756 -0.058 -0.044 -0.0766 
Income (0.0918) (0.092) (0.092) (0.0918) 
Period 1  -0.612*** -0.526*** -0.569*** -0.600*** 
(1990–1994) (0.0594) (0.0595) (0.0595) (0.0594) 
Period 2  -0.626*** -0.663*** -0.765*** -0.595*** 
(2001–2004) (0.0567) (0.057) (0.0586) (0.0567) 
Period 3 -0.306*** -0.530*** -0.301*** -0.218*** 
 (2005–2009) (0.0526) (0.054) (0.0525) (0.0548) 
Cash -0.233 -0.257 -0.305* -0.233 
Holdings (0.171) (0.170) (0.171) (0.171) 
Period 1* 0.221 0.196 0.203 0.221 
Cash holdings (0.291) (0.291) (0.291) (0.291) 
Period 2* 0.744** 0.621* 0.695** 0.744** 
Cash holdings (0.228) (0.228) (0.229) (0.228) 
Period 3* 0.530** 0.420** 0.465** 0.530** 
Cash holdings (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) 
Institutional   1.318***   
Ownership  (0.077)   
Transient    1.536***  
Ownership   (0.145)  
Dedicated     0.918*** 
Ownership    (0.163) 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Cash Holdings—Impact on M&A performance 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent CAR(-2,1) CAR(-2,1) CAR(-2,1) 
Tobin's Q 0.000996 0.000774 0.000584 
 (0.000976) (0.000974) (0.000976) 
ROE -0.0001137 -0.000696 -0.0001483 
  (0.000774) (0.000779) (0.000787) 
Competitive -0.0318** -0.0319** -0.0313** 
Deals (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
Cash 0.0118*** 0.0109*** 0.0111*** 
Deal (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Horizontal -0.00045 -0.00007 -0.00000 
Deal (0.00362) (0.00362) (0.00362) 
Size -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
  (0.000907) (0.000907) (0.000892) 
Growth -0.00218 -0.00157 -0.00219 
 (0.00667) (0.00667) (0.00667) 
Leverage 0.00482 0.00658 0.00517 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Cash Flow -0.0473*** -0.0499*** -0.055** 
  (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
Period 1  0.00412 0.00408 0.00505 
(1990–1994) (0.00459) (0.00459) (0.00594) 
Period 2  0.00719 0.01156 0.00530 
(2001–2004) (0.00466) (0.00487) (0.00474) 
Period 3 0.00324 -0.00186 -0.00526 
 (2005–2009) (0.00460) (0.00444) (0.00508) 
Institutional -0.0306***      
Ownership  (0.006)     
Transient    -0.0533***    
Ownership    (0.0128)   
Dedicated    -0.0309**  
Ownership    (0.0178) 
Cash -0.02428  -0.02241 -0.02581  
Holdings  (0.0179)  (0.0180)  (0.0179) 
Period 1* 0.02457 0.02695 0.02612 
Cash Holdings (0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0318) 
Period 2*  -0.020  -0.01891  -0.02283 
Cash Holdings  (0.0255)  (0.0256)  (0.0255) 
Period 3* 0.006 0.00518 0.00345 
Cash Holdings (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0224) 
Industry fixed effects YES  YES  YES  
Observations 5,201 5,201 5,201 
R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.038 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 74 
 
7
4 
Table 4. Institutional Ownership—Propensity to Engage in M&As 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable M&A M&A M&A M&A M&A 
Tobin's Q 0.0341*** 0.0240*** 0.0305*** 0.0340*** 0.0304*** 
 (0.00906) (0.00910) (0.00907) (0.00905) (0.00907) 
Size 0.160*** 0.0620*** 0.130*** 0.150*** 0.119*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0110) 
Growth -0.0394 -0.0522 -0.0579 -0.0384 -0.0572 
 (0.0506) (0.0506) (0.0506) (0.0507) (0.0506) 
Cash 0.140 0.0437 0.0227 0.129 0.00829 
Holdings (0.115) (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.116) 
Leverage -0.189* -0.139 -0.189* -0.180* -0.182* 
 (0.0972) (0.0961) (0.0969) (0.0971) (0.0968) 
Cash flow 2.708*** 2.293*** 2.490*** 2.673*** 2.451*** 
  (0.164) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) (0.163) 
Net -0.0781 -0.0564 -0.0440 -0.0777 -0.0426 
Income (0.0917) (0.0918) (0.0916) (0.0917) (0.0916) 
Period 1  -0.580*** -0.540*** -0.632*** -0.581*** -0.603*** 
(1990–1994) (0.0466) (0.0897) (0.0612) (0.0665) (0.0755) 
Period 2  -0.512*** -0.494*** -0.638*** -0.465*** -0.561*** 
(2001–2004) (0.0439) (0.0891) (0.0652) (0.0575) (0.0731) 
Period 3 -0.227*** -0.307*** -0.269*** -0.0967** -0.129** 
 (2005–2009) (0.0408) (0.0918) (0.0592) (0.0490) (0.0650) 
Institutional   1.444***    
Ownership  (0.112)    
Period 1*   0.130       
Institutional Ownership   (0.194)       
Period 2*  -0.160    
Institutional Ownership  (0.160)    
Period 3*   -0.285*       
Institutional Ownership   (0.146)       
Transient    1.404***  1.456*** 
Ownership   (0.242)  (0.243) 
Period 1*     1.277**   1.203** 
Transient Ownership     (0.516)   (0.521) 
Period 2*   -0.0223  -0.0793 
Transient Ownership   (0.308)  (0.311) 
Period 3*     0.351   0.353 
Transient Ownership     (0.390)   (0.390) 
Dedicated     1.052*** 1.173*** 
Ownership    (0.212) (0.212) 
Period 1*       0.142 -0.0801 
Dedicated Ownership       (0.437) (0.446) 
Period 2*    -0.140 -0.388 
Dedicated Ownership    (0.397) (0.406) 
Period 3*       -1.334** -1.351** 
Dedicated Ownership       (0.557) (0.549) 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald Chi Square 979.95 1266.15 1095.97 1014.75 1130.89 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4-1. Marginal Effects of Institutional Ownership in Logit Regression 
 
 Dy/Dx Std. error z P>|z| 95% confidence interval 
Institutional 
ownership 
1.359482 0.078892 17.23 0.000 1.204857 1.514106 
Transient 
ownership 
1.765823 0.163943 10.77 0.000 1.444501 2.087146 
Dedicated 
ownership 
0.7178399 0.1934405 3.71 0.000 0.3387034 1.096976 
 
 
Table 4-2. Predicted Probability of Being a Bidder (1995~2000)  
 
  Ownership level 
Impact 
  0% 40% 
Institutional Investors 8.80% 14.30% 5.50% 
Transient Investors 12.40% 22.20% 9.80% 
Dedicated Investors 13.80% 17.60% 3.80% 
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Figure 1. Graphic Presentation of Predicted Probability (1995~2000)  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure2. Graphic Presentation of Predicted Probability (Sub-sample Analysis)   
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Table 5. OLS on M&A Performance (CAR) with Firm-Clustered Standard Error 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent CAR(-2,1) CAR(-2,1) CAR(-2,1) CAR(-2,1) CAR(-2,1) 
Tobin's Q 0.000585 0.000996 0.000997 0.000838 0.000577 
 (0.000971) (0.000971) (0.000969) (0.000966) (0.000968) 
ROE -9.07e-05 -0.000102 -0.000160 -9.80e-05 -0.000154 
  (0.000774) (0.000784) (0.000787) (0.000771) (0.000793) 
Competitive -0.0316** -0.0318* -0.0334** -0.0322** -0.0317* 
Deals (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0162) 
Cash 0.0109*** 0.0117*** 0.0120*** 0.0109*** 0.0112*** 
Deal (0.00307) (0.00306) (0.00305) (0.00306) (0.00306) 
Horizontal -0.000193 0.000391 0.000264 3.64e-05 -0.000128 
Deal (0.00363) (0.00363) (0.00364) (0.00363) (0.00363) 
Size -0.0073*** -0.0051*** -0.0048*** -0.0063*** -0.0070*** 
  (0.000907) (0.000913) (0.000893) (0.000897) (0.000898) 
Growth -0.00231 -0.00242 -0.00269 -0.00174 -0.00244 
 (0.00657) (0.00658) (0.00653) (0.00658) (0.00656) 
Cash  -0.0275** -0.0242** -0.0241** -0.0228** -0.0269** 
Holdings (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0112) 
Leverage 0.00504 0.00452 0.00354 0.00567 0.00455 
 (0.00787) (0.00771) (0.00759) (0.00770) (0.00775) 
Cash Flow -0.0550*** -0.0461*** -0.0465*** -0.0489*** -0.0536*** 
  (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0176) 
Period 1  0.00855* 0.00710 0.0165 0.00818 0.0128 
(1990–1994) (0.00459) (0.00457) (0.0131) (0.00746) (0.00826) 
Period 2  0.00251 0.00371 -0.00121 0.00245 0.00170 
(2001–2004) (0.00381) (0.00383) (0.00995) (0.00635) (0.00570) 
Period 3 -0.00127 0.00436 -0.0172* -0.00998* -0.00570 
 (2005–2009) (0.00344) (0.00362) (0.00998) (0.00564) (0.00507) 
Institutional   -0.0309*** -0.0422***     
Ownership   (0.00610) (0.0107)     
Period 1*   -0.0253   
Institutional Ownership   (0.0240)   
Period 2*     0.0105     
Institutional Ownership     (0.0161)     
Period 3*   0.0351**   
Institutional Ownership   (0.0150)   
Transient        -0.0828***   
Ownership       (0.0236)   
Period 1*    -0.0201  
Transient Ownership    (0.0521)  
Period 2*       0.0408   
Transient Ownership       (0.0295)   
Period 3*    0.0766**  
Transient Ownership    (0.0385)  
Dedicated          -0.0293 
Ownership         (0.0220) 
Period 1*     -0.0415 
Dedicated Ownership     (0.0469) 
Period 2*         -0.00396 
Dedicated Ownership         (0.0352) 
Period 3*     0.0587 
Dedicated Ownership     (0.108) 
Industry fixed effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 5,201 5,201 5,201 5,201 5,201 
R-squared 0.037 0.041 0.044 0.041 0.038 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Heckman’s Correction on M&A Performance 
Dependent 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Variables CAR(-2,1) Selection CAR(-2,1) Selection CAR(-2,1) Selection 
Tobin's Q -0.000270 0.115 -0.000365 0.115 -0.000544 0.115 
 (0.000962) (0.240) (0.000961) (0.240) (0.000963) (0.240) 
ROE -0.000579   -0.000513   -0.000623   
  (0.000500)   (0.000500)   (0.000504)   
Competitive -0.00640  -0.00621  -0.00585  
Deals (0.0121)  (0.0121)  (0.0121)  
Cash 0.0104***   0.00964***   0.00969***   
Deal (0.00317)   (0.00316)   (0.00317)   
Horizontal 0.00211  0.00190  0.00171  
Deal (0.00363)  (0.00362)  (0.00364)  
Size -0.0024** -0.0844 -0.0035*** -0.084 -0.0043*** -0.0844 
  (0.000982) (0.163) (0.000903) (0.163) (0.000895) (0.163) 
Levarage 0.00519 2.849 0.00701 2.849 0.00543 2.849 
 (0.00782) (2.840) (0.00782) (2.840) (0.00784) (2.840) 
Cash -0.0133 1.459 -0.0104 1.459 -0.0160 1.459 
Holdings (0.0105) (2.104) (0.0105) (2.104) (0.0105) (2.104) 
Growth 0.00816 0.450 0.00898* 0.450 0.00792 0.450 
 (0.00532) (1.071) (0.00533) (1.071) (0.00534) (1.071) 
Cash flow -0.00264 0.687 -0.00665 0.687 -0.00749 0.687 
  (0.0115) (1.707) (0.0114) (1.707) (0.0114) (1.707) 
Institutional -0.039***      
Ownership (0.00945)      
Period 1* 0.00186           
Institutional Ownership (0.0179)           
Period 2* 0.00223      
Institutional Ownership (0.0149)      
Period 3* 0.0336*           
Institutional Ownership (0.0178)           
Institutional Ownership  14.11  14.11  14.11 
(Industry Average)  (9.436)  (9.436)  (9.436) 
Mutual fund   0.0290   0.0290   0.0290 
Outflow   (0.0520)   (0.0520)   (0.0520) 
Lambda  -0.0231  -0.0264  -0.0229 
    (0.118)   (0.117)   (0.118) 
Transient    -0.0741***    
Ownership   (0.0189)    
Period 1*     -0.0284       
Transient Ownership     (0.0454)       
Period 2*   0.0229    
Transient Ownership   (0.0266)    
Period 3*     -0.00923       
Transient Ownership     (0.0541)       
Dedicated     -0.0149  
Ownership     (0.0179)  
Period 1*         -0.00107   
Dedicated Ownership         (0.0411)   
Period 2*     -0.0312  
Dedicated Ownership     (0.0377)  
Period 3*         0.0127   
Dedicated Ownership         (0.0675)   
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008 22,008 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Propensity to Engage in Cash/Non-Public Target/Horizontal Deal  
Model 1 2 3 
Dependent Cash Non-public Horizontal 
Variable deal deal deal 
Tobin's Q 0.0175 0.0236** 0.0269*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0105) (0.00980) 
Size 0.130*** 0.0451*** 0.104*** 
  (0.0127) (0.0143) (0.0119) 
Growth -0.168** 0.0991 -0.0931* 
 (0.0670) (0.0625) (0.0559) 
Cash holdings 0.0783 -0.307** 0.135 
  (0.139) (0.151) (0.125) 
Leverage -0.448*** -0.0178 -0.177* 
 (0.120) (0.121) (0.106) 
Cash flow 3.625*** 1.343*** 2.459*** 
  (0.223) (0.184) (0.178) 
Net income 0.160** -0.225** 0.0953 
 (0.0808) (0.0950) (0.0839) 
Period 1  -0.773*** -0.284*** -0.623*** 
(1990–1994) (0.0985) (0.0991) (0.0839) 
Period 2  -0.509*** -0.219** -0.601*** 
(2001–2004) (0.0905) (0.0943) (0.0814) 
Period 3 0.123 0.0607 -0.119* 
 (2005–2009) (0.0760) (0.0876) (0.0707) 
Transient  1.162*** 1.406*** 1.355*** 
Ownership (0.281) (0.325) (0.259) 
Period 1* 1.712*** 1.267* 1.511*** 
Transient Ownership (0.621) (0.669) (0.562) 
Period 2* 0.101 0.00549 -0.0131 
Transient Ownership (0.367) (0.402) (0.337) 
Period 3* 0.615 -0.320 0.572 
Transient Ownership (0.440) (0.523) (0.416) 
Dedicated  1.450*** 0.400 1.263*** 
Ownership (0.241) (0.301) (0.226) 
Period 1* -0.143 0.145 0.0193 
Dedicated Ownership (0.549) (0.611) (0.485) 
Period 2* -0.493 0.661 -0.196 
Dedicated Ownership (0.476) (0.517) (0.439) 
Period 3* -1.511** -1.162 -1.030* 
Dedicated Ownership (0.610) (0.798) (0.575) 
Industry Fixed Effects  YES  YES YES  
Observations 33,239 33,239 33,239 
Number of Firms 6,700 6,700 6,700 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Managerial Ownership—Propensity to Engage in M&As 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Dependent Variable M&A M&A M&A M&A 
Tobin's Q 0.0459** 0.048** 0.0473** 0.0461** 
 (0.0187) (0.019) (0.0188) (0.0187) 
Size 0.116*** 0.106*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Growth -0.193* -0.201 -0.206* -0.193* 
 (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) 
Cash 0.138 0.116 0.088 0.139 
Holdings (0.204) (0.205) (0.205) (0.204) 
Leverage - 0.135 - 0.135 - 0.156 - 0.137 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) 
Cash flow 3.445*** 3.445*** 3.302*** 3.446*** 
  (0.370) (0.370) (0.373) (0.371) 
Net -0.027 -0.055 -0.001 -0.030 
Income (0.212) (0.215) (0.215) (0.213) 
Period 1  -0.527*** -0.488*** -0.506*** -0.524*** 
(1990–1994) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) 
Period 2  -0.503*** -0.537*** -0.582*** -0.497*** 
(2001–2004) (0.074) (0.075) (0.081) (0.075) 
Period 3 -0.246*** -0.353*** -0.246*** -0.224** 
 (2005–2009) (0.0067) (0.075) (0.067) (0.075) 
Managerial -0.011** -0.007 -0.009** -0.010** 
Ownership (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Period 1* 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 
Mgt. Ownership (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Period 2* -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
Mgt. Ownership (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Period 3* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
Mgt. Ownership (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Institutional   0.528***   
Ownership  (0.161)   
Transient    0.619**  
Ownership   (0.251)  
Dedicated     0.180 
Ownership    (0.288) 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Managerial Ownership—Impact on M&A performance 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent CAR(-2,1) CAR(-2,1) CAR(-2,1) 
Tobin's Q 0.000871 0.000804 0.000871 
 (0.001274) (0.001278) (0.001274) 
ROE -0.0005503 -0.0005291 -0.0005503 
  (0.0005985) (0.0006037) (0.0005985) 
Competitive -0.001368 -0.001630 -0.001368 
Deals (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
Cash 0.0119*** 0.0116*** 0.0119*** 
Deal (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Horizontal -0.000479 -0.000479 -0.000479 
Deal (0.00398) (0.00397) (0.00398) 
Size -0.002518** -0.00269** -0.002518** 
  (0.001154) (0.001162) (0.001154) 
Growth -0.00466 -0.00466 -0.00466 
 (0.00741) (0.00741) (0.00741) 
Cash -0.00699 -0.00553 -0.00699 
Holdings (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0135) 
Leverage -0.004419 -0.00403 -0.004419 
 (0.00931) (0.00931) (0.00931) 
Cash Flow -0.0202 -0.0202 -0.0202 
  (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0204) 
Period 1  0.00483 0.00599 0.00483 
(1990–1994) (0.00527) (0.00568) (0.00527) 
Period 2  0.0079 0.0095 0.0079 
(2001–2004) (0.00434) (0.00486) (0.00434) 
Period 3 0.01017 0.00759 0.01017 
 (2005–2009) (0.00431) (0.00420) (0.00431) 
Institutional -0.009   -0.009  
Ownership  (0.009)   (0.009) 
Transient    -0.0187    
Ownership    (0.0169)   
Dedicated    -0.01467 
Ownership   (0.0212) 
Managerial -0.00033 -0.00037 -0.00033 
Ownership  (0.00036)  (0.00036)  (0.00036) 
Period 1* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mgt. Ownership (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Period 2*  -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000 
Mgt. Ownership  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Period 3* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mgt. Ownership (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry fixed effects YES  YES  YES  
Observations 2,472 2,472 2,472 
R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.041 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 10. Summary - Hypothesis and Results 
 
Hypothesis 
Results 
Sign 
Statistical  
Significance 
Economic  
Significance 
Cash  
Holdings 
Agency 
Theory 
Propensity 
(H1a) + 
   
Performance 
(H2a) - - 
Marginally 
Significant 
(10% Level) 
Non-significant 
(Impact Size is 
less than 1%) 
Behavioral  
Theory 
Propensity 
(H1b) - - 
Non-
significant 
 
Performance 
(H2b) + 
   
Managerial  
Ownership 
Agency 
Theory 
Propensity 
(H3a) + 
   
Performance 
(H4a) - - 
Marginally 
Significant 
(5% Level) 
Non-significant 
(Impact Size is 
less than 1%) 
Behavioral  
Theory 
Propensity 
(H3b) - - 
Non-
significant 
 
Performance 
(H4b) + 
   
Institutional  
Ownership 
Baseline Propensity 
(H5) + + 
Significant Significant 
(Impact Size is 
5.5% increase 
in being a 
bidder) 
Performance 
(H6) + 
   
Agency 
Theory 
Propensity 
(H9a/b) - 
   
Performance 
(H10a/b) + 
   
Behavioral  
Theory 
Propensity 
(H7a/b) + + 
Significant Significant 
(Impact Size is 
10% increase 
in being a 
bidder) 
Performance 
(H8a/b) - - 
Significant Significant 
(Impact Size is 
8% in M&A 
performance) 
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